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Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
Daniel J. Hemelt & Aaron L. Nielsontt
The Supreme Court says that Chevron has two steps: Is the statuteambiguous
(Step One), and, if so, is the agency's interpretationof the ambiguous provision a
permissible one (Step Two)? Yet over the last three decades, the DC Circuit has inserted an intermediate step between Steps One and Two: Did the agency recognize
that the statutoryprovision is ambiguous? If not, then the DC Circuit refuses to proceed to Chevron Step Two and remands the matter to the agency. This doctrinewhich we dub "Chevron Step One-and-a-Half"-has led to dozens of agency losses
in the DC Circuitand DCfederal districtcourt, but it has gone entirely unmentioned
in administrativelaw casebooks and is rarely referenced in the academic literature.
The few who have not ignored the doctrine have treated it with skepticism. Chief
among those skeptics is now-Chief Justice John Roberts, who while a DC Circuit
judge criticized his colleagues for applying the doctrine.
This Article presents a more sympathetic account of Chevron Step One-and-aHalf. After providing an overview of the Chevron Step One-and-a-Halfdoctrine, we
offer several theories why Chevron Step One-and-a-Halfcases continue to arise, even
though agencies can avoid the doctrine by stating that they would hew to their view
regardless of whether the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous. Some number
of Chevron Step One-and-a-Halfcases might be explained by the fact that agencies
are ignorant of the doctrine or ambivalent about their own policies, but we suggest
that there also may be strategic reasons why agency actors might maintain that a
statute is unambiguous. For instance, agency lawyers with a preferencefor aparticular reading (or with patrons who have such a preference) might seek to increase
influence over policy by declaring that a statute can be interpreted only one way.
Alternately, an agency might claim that a statuteis unambiguous in orderto reduce
the probabilitythat the White House's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
will second-guess the agency's choice. In a similar manner, an agency might attempt
to evade political accountabilityfor an unpopularpolicy by claiming that the choice
was compelled by Congress. Finally, an agency might maintain that a statute is unambiguous in order to "lock in" an interpretationso that future administrationscannot undo it. After identifying the potential causes of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
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cases, we consider how courts ought to respond to the potential for strategic agency
behavior. We suggest that, when viewed in this light, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
helps to uphold the theoreticaljustificationsfor Chevron deference. While Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half remands also impose undeniable costs on administrative
agencies, we argue that these costs ought to be evaluated against the considerable
benefits that the doctrinepotentially brings.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc' has created a cottage industry in
1

467 US 837 (1984).
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choreography. Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion introduced the
famous Chevron two-step. 2 Thereafter, Professors Thomas Merrill
and Kristin Hickman identified a Chevron "step zero"-"the inquiry that must be made in deciding whether courts should turn
to the Chevron framework at all."3 (Some subdivide Step Zero into

two steps of its own, creating a four-step test.)4 A quarter century
after the Chevron decision, Professors Matthew C. Stephenson
and Adrian Vermeule declared that in fact "Chevron has only one
step": "whether the agency's construction is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation."5 Some judges now view Chevron
as "a three-step inquiry,"6 while others suggest that the number
of steps probably does not matter much in practice.7 Little wonder, then, that others throw up their hands (or their feet?) and
dismiss the entire step-defining exercise.8
One might infer from this choreographic confusion that we
now have too many formulations of Chevron, with no need for
See id at 842-43.
Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Georgetown L
J 833, 836 (2001). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 191
n 19 (2006) (crediting Merrill and Hickman for the article's title).
4
See, for example, William S. Jordan III, JudicialReview of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer Is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 Admin L
Rev 719, 725 (2002) ("[T]he Court erected a new four step test to replace what we once
knew as the Chevron two step.").
5 Matthew C. Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va
L Rev 597, 598 n 4, 599 (2009). But see Kenneth A. Bamberger and Peter L. Strauss, Chevron's Two Steps, 95 Va L Rev 611, 624-25 (2009) (rejecting Stephenson and Vermeule's
argument); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 Ind L J 605, 608
(2014) (same).
6
See Alaska Wilderness League v Jewell, 788 F3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir 2015)
("[U]nder Chevron . . . we engage in a three-step inquiry when reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute."); Restrepo v Attorney Generalof United States, 617 F3d 787, 792
(3d Cir 2010) ("When confronted with a potential Chevron application, we administer a
three-step analysis.").
7
See, for example, Carter v Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc, 736 F3d 722, 731 (6th Cir
2013) (Sutton concurring) (arguing that "[i]f you believe that Chevron has two steps, you
would" reach a result one way, and "[i]f you believe that Chevron has only one step," you
would reach the same result another way).
8
See, for example, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv L Rev 2118, 2154 (2016):
2

3

In short, the problem with certain applications of Chevron, as I see it, is that the
doctrine is so indeterminate-and thus can be antithetical to the neutral, impartial rule of law-because of the initial clarity versus ambiguity decision. . . . [W]e
need to consider eliminating that inquiry as the threshold trigger.
See also Jack M. Beermann, End the FailedChevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn L Rev 779, 834 n 218 (2010)
("The number of steps in Chevron in any given case may turn out to depend on who writes
the Court's opinion.").
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another. One might also draw the conclusion that a doctrine designed to simplify judicial review of agency statutory interpretations has instead had the opposite effect. And yet one might infer
from this Article's title that the authors, rather than trying to
streamline Chevron, are scheming to propose yet another step in
the Chevron shuffle-or, more precisely, a half step. One might
ask, quite fairly, whether the Chevron dance really needs another
move. (One might also groan that we already have taken the
dance metaphor too far.)9
Although we are mindful of Chevron fatigue, the fact remains
that neither the one-step, the two-step, the three-step, nor the
four-step formulation of Chevron captures an important doctrinal
development that has occurred in the federal courts. In the classic
Chevron two-step, the court asks at Step One "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue"; if the answer
is negative, then the court proceeds to Chevron Step Two and asks
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."10 The DC Circuit and a handful of other
courts, however, now do something different. After deciding that
the statute is ambiguous but before deciding whether the agency's
construction is permissible, these courts ask a separate question:
whether the agency itself recognized that it was dealing with an
ambiguous statute. In these courts, a misstep at this intermediate
stage can be fatal to an agency's cause: the court will remandsometimes with vacatur-if the agency claimed that the statute
is clear but the court concludes it is not. In other words, the
agency will lose if it mistakenly says that the issue can be resolved at Chevron Step One while the court determines that it
should be resolved at Chevron Step Two.
One might call this move "the Prill doctrine" in honor of Prill
v National Labor Relations Board," the DC Circuit case from
1985 that is sometimes cited as the rule's origin.12 Or perhaps one
9 But others have taken it further. See, for example, Northpoint Technology, Ltd v
Federal Communications Commission, 412 F3d 145, 151 (DC Cir 2005) (Henderson)
("[]nder the Chevron two-step, we stop the music at step one if the Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.. .. But if the statute is silent or ambiguous, we dance
on . . . [to] step two.") (quotation marks omitted); Braintree Electric Light Department v
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 667 F3d 1284, 1288 (DC Cir 2012) (Garland)
("[T]he Chevron two-step is a dance for the court.").
10 Chevron, 467 US at 842-43.
11 755 F2d 941 (DC Cir 1985).
12 See id at 942. See also Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative
Law, 117 Colum L Rev 253, 296-301 (2017) (discussing "Prill cases," "Prillclaims," and
"Prillviolation[s]").
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might call it "the Negusie doctrine" in honor of Negusie v Holder,13
a 2009 case in which the Supreme Court arguably applied the rule
as well (though, as discussed below, we think the Negusie rule is
of a slightly different nature).14 We choose to call it "Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half," because-well-that is what it is: a way station
between Chevron Step One and Chevron Step Two. Whatever one
calls it, however, we should recognize it for what it is and ask why
it exists. This Article attempts to do just that.
While Chevron Step One-and-a-Half has up until now been a
doctrine without a name, it is nonetheless a doctrine with skeptics.
Perhaps chief among them is now-Chief Justice John Roberts. In
a concurring opinion that he wrote while on the DC Circuit, thenJudge Roberts criticized his colleagues for invoking Prill and its
progeny.1 To be sure, Roberts said that he had "no quarrel with
the basic proposition ...

that when an agency erroneously con-

cludes that a statutory interpretation is required by Congress, we
should remand to give the agency an opportunity to interpret the
statute in the first instance."16 But he argued that the doctrine
ought not apply unless there is "real and genuine doubt concerning what interpretation the agency would choose" if the agency
were aware of the ambiguity.17 In all other cases, Roberts said,
the doctrine we dub Chevron Step One-and-a-Half "outstrips its
rationale"18 and "convert[s] judicial review of agency action into a
ping-pong game."19 Professor Nicholas Bagley, in turn, has urged
that such "real and genuine doubt" will be vanishingly rare. "The
very fact that an agency has read the statute in a particular way,"
wrote Bagley, is itself strong "evidence" that the agency "prefers
the interpretation it adopted to the one that it did not adopt."20
And quite often that probative evidence will be backed up by a
representation-in writing and signed by agency lawyers-stating that the agency would stay the course on remand even if the
reviewing court were to conclude that the statute is susceptible of
555 US 511 (2009).
See notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
15 See PDK Laboratories Inc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration,
362 F3d 786, 808-09 (DC Cir 2004) (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
16 Id at 808 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
17 Id (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
18 Id at 809 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19 PDK Laboratories,362 F3d at 809 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment), quoting Time, Inc v United States Postal Service, 667 F2d 329, 335 (2d
Cir 1981).
20 Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 297 (cited in note 12).
13
14
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multiple meanings.21 In light of this reality, the chief justice and
Bagley would have Chevron Step One-and-a-Half be invoked infrequently rather than become a standard part of the Chevron
analysis.22
Indeed, regardless of whether one subscribes to the view of
the chief justice and Bagley, one might wonder why Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half is ever invoked. That is, why would an agency
ever insist that a statute is unambiguous? From an agency's per-

spective, disclaiming ambiguity seems like a self-inflicted wound,
and an easily avoided self-inflicted wound at that. In fact, if agencies seek to enhance their own autonomy (as some common accounts of agency motivation maintain2), one might expect them
always to argue that the statute is ambiguous so long as a nonfrivolous argument for ambiguity exists. After all, under Chevron,
ambiguity acts as a grant of discretion,24 and discretion is power.25

Why would an agency disavow discretion it could credibly claim?
Yet Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands have occurred in
dozens of cases-including in high-profile matters.26 This means
that agencies are denying (or at least declining to acknowledge)
that the relevant statute is ambiguous, even when nonfrivolous
arguments in favor of ambiguity are available (arguments that a
court ultimately concludes are meritorious). So what is causing
these agencies to stumble on the path to Step Two? We suggest
several reasons why agencies might maintain that a statute is
unambiguous even though such an assertion disadvantages the
agency in litigation. The first, and perhaps most mundane, is
See id at 297-98.
See PDK Laboratories,362 F3d at 809 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 301 (cited in note 12).
23 See, for example, John C. Coffee Jr, The Future as History: The Prospects for
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw U L Rev 641,
702 (1999) ("[T]he occasions are rare on which a regulatory agency has voluntarily ceded
control without some compelling need that required such a surrender. The usual assumptions of political science are that public agencies act to maximize their powers, just as private firms seek to maximize revenues or profits."). See also Talk America, Inc v Michigan
Bell Telephone Co, 564 US 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia concurring) ("By contrast, deferring to an
agency's interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which
give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.").
24 See Peter L. Strauss, "Deference"Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron
Space" and "Skidmore Weight", 112 Colum L Rev 1143, 1145 (2012) (explaining that
Chevron "empower[s]" agencies "to act in a manner that creates legal obligations").
25 See, for example, BurlingtonTruck Lines, Inc v United States, 371 US 156, 167 (1962).
26 See, for example, Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc v Food & DrugAdministration,
441 F3d 1, 4-5 (DC Cir 2006) (declaring in a case involving a major cholesterol drug that
"[w]e therefore generally remand for an agency to make the first interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term when it has failed to do so previously").
21

22
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agency ignorance: agency lawyers may simply be unaware of the
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine. But while ignorance might
be to blame the first time that an agency encounters the doctrine,
the explanation is less plausible as time goes on, especially for
agencies that have had actions remanded by the DC Circuit on
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds on multiple occasions.27 A
second reason is agency ambivalence: The agency might believe
that a particular result is statutorily compelled while also being
unconvinced that it is an optimal policy. The agency might decide
that if a court can find ambiguity when the agency could not, then
the agency would be happy to consider adopting an alternative
approach. We think that this too is a plausible explanation in
some cases, though not in all.
We suggest here that even when agency actors are aware of
the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine, and even when they
have a firm preference for a particular interpretation, they sometimes may have strategic reasons to say that a statute is unambiguous despite the potentially negative litigation consequences.
One such strategic motivation involves intra-agency politics:
agency lawyers who prefer a particular outcome might claim that
their preferred outcome is statutorily ordained, anticipating that
nonlawyers within the agency will be ill-equipped to contest that
claim. A second strategic motivation involves intra-executive
branch politics: an agency might claim that a particular result is
statutorily compelled so as to avoid having to convince the White
House's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) that
the agency's preferred outcome is cost justified relative to feasible
alternatives. A third strategic motivation involves interbranch
politics: an agency might seek to shirk blame for an unpopular
policy by claiming that responsibility lies with Congress. Fourth,
an agency might maintain that a statute unambiguously points
one way in an effort to prevent future administrations from choosing a different route.
After laying out the various reasons why Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half cases might continue to arise, we consider whether
these reasons justify the doctrine's existence. Despite the hostility
that the doctrine faces from some quarters, we suggest that Step

27 The Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Department of Transportation, and the National Labor Relations Board are
all repeat losers before the DC Circuit in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases. See Online
Appendix.
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One-and-a-Half produces potentially important benefits. In particular, this half step advances the values that motivate (and help
justify) Chevron in the first place. If agencies are entrusted with
discretionary power on the grounds that they are more accountable
than courts, then judicial review should encourage agencies to
take responsibility for their decisions. Chevron Step One-and-aHalf can serve to encourage this accountability in an administrable
way. It can also help to ensure that deference is reserved for cases
in which agencies employ the expertise that they (at least ostensibly) have and that courts do not have. To be sure, the doctrine
imposes costs as well, in the form of judicial remands and further
litigation. Neither the benefits nor the costs are easily quantifiable,
and we cannot confidently say whether the net welfare effects of
the doctrine are positive or negative. What we can say, though, is
that the potential benefits of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half have
been overlooked so far. This Article seeks to bring those potential
benefits to the fore.
This Article concludes by considering the choices courts must
make when applying the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine.
For example, should the doctrine be triggered whenever an
agency fails to acknowledge that a statutory provision might be
ambiguous-or only when the agency affirmatively states that the
statutory provision is clear? Our proffered justifications for the
doctrine might counsel in favor of the former, but the DC Circuit
tends to lean toward the latter view. Likewise, should the application of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half result in a remand to the
agency-or should it also result in vacatur of the agency's rule?
Remand without vacatur reduces Chevron Step One-and-a-Half s
costs, and yet those "costs" are arguably the doctrine's virtuesthe costs of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half potentially deter agencies from hiding their cards.
We realize, of course, that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half further complicates the Chevron analysis. The simpler version of
Chevron set out in administrative law casebooks, however, does
not descriptively reflect what is happening in the nation's "administrative law court."28 We hope that by naming the Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half doctrine, explaining how it might be justified, delineating its contours, and describing its applications, we can cut
through some of the complexity.

28 The Contributionof the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin L Rev 507,
509 (1988) (quoting remarks by Judge Patricia Wald).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half with an illustrative example. Part II describes the origins of this doctrine and explains why Step Oneand-a-Half is consistent with, but nonetheless distinct from, other
administrative law doctrines like hard-look review and the bar on
post hoc rationalizations. Part III then addresses a key puzzle
presented by Step One-and-a-Half: Why do these cases continue
to arise? The answer, we submit, is central to why Chevron Step
One-and-Half can be a beneficial doctrine. Part IV then tentatively defends Step One-and-a-Half from its critics by demonstrating the connection between the doctrine and Chevron's accountability and expertise justifications; whatever one thinks of the
doctrine, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on its costs while ignoring its benefits. Finally, Part V considers some of the difficult
choices that courts must make when applying Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half in concrete cases.
I. ON PRILL AND POLAR BEARS

We begin by describing Chevron Step One-and-a-Halfs application in a particular case-not because it is an exceptional example
of the doctrine, but because it is an entirely ordinary example.29 The
29 The DC Circuit has ruled against an agency on Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
grounds in each of the following cases:

NextEra Desert Center Blythe, LLC v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
2017 WL 1228577, *3-4 (DC Cir);
United States v Ross, 2017 wL 728040, *4-5 (DC Cir);
Noble Energy, Inc v Salazar, 671 F3d 1241, 1245-46 (DC Cir 2012);
PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission,
665 F3d 203, 208-10 (DC Cir 2011);
United States Postal Service v Postal Regulatory Commission, 640 F3d 1263,
1268 (DC Cir 2011);
Prime Time InternationalCo v Vilsack, 599 F3d 678, 683 (DC Cir 2010);
Labor, Mine Safety and HealthAdministration v National Cement Co of California,
494 F3d 1066, 1073-75 (DC Cir 2007);
Menkes v Departmentof Homeland Security, 486 F3d 1307, 1313-14 (DC Cir 2007);
Peter PanBus Lines, Inc v FederalMotor CarrierSafety Administration, 471 F3d
1350, 1353-54 (DC Cir 2006);
Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc v Food & DrugAdministration, 441 F3d 1, 4-5

(DC Cir 2006);
PDK LaboratoriesInc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362
F3d 786, 797-98 (DC Cir 2004);
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Endangered Species Act of 197330 (ESA) defines an "endangered
species" as "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range."3' The Act does not
address, however, whether a species is "endangered" when the
Arizona v Thompson, 281 F3d 248, 259-60 (DC Cir 2002);
ITT Industries, Inc v National Labor Relations Board, 251 F3d 995, 1004-05
(DC Cir 2001);
Jacoby v NationalLabor Relations Board, 233 F3d 611, 617 (DC Cir 2000);
GTE Service Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 224 F3d 768, 775-76
(DC Cir 2000);
TransitionalHospitals Corp of Louisiana,Inc v Shalala, 222 F3d 1019, 1029 (DC
Cir 2000);
PanAmSat Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 198 F3d 890, 896-97
(DC Cir 1999);
Sea-Land Service, Inc v Departmentof Transportation,137 F3d 640, 646-47 (DC
Cir 1998);
Alarm Industry Communications Committee v Federal Communications
Commission, 131 F3d 1066, 1071-72 (DC Cir 1997);
City of Los Angeles Department of Airports v United States Department of
Transportation,103 F3d 1027, 1033-34 (DC Cir 1997);
Cajun ElectricPower Cooperative, Inc v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
924 F2d 1132, 1135-37 (DC Cir 1991);
American Petroleum Institute v United States Environmental ProtectionAgency,
906 F2d 729, 740 (DC Cir 1990) (per curiam);
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co v Interstate Commerce Commission, 826 F2d
1125, 1129 (DC Cir 1987);
Phillips Petroleum Co v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 792 F2d 1165,
1169-70, 1172 (DC Cir 1986);
Prill, 755 F2d at 942.
The list is nonexhaustive and does not include cases in which the DC federal district court
invoked Chevron Step One-and-a-Half and the agency did not press an appeal before the
DC Circuit. See, for example, American Petroleum Institute v Securities and Exchange
Commission, 953 F Supp 2d 5, 13 (DDC 2013); International Swaps and Derivatives
Association v United States Commodity FuturesTrading Commission, 887 F Supp 2d 259,
280-82 (DDC 2012); Coalition for Common Sense in Government Procurement v United
States, 671 F Supp 2d 48, 55-56 (DDC 2009). Nor does it include cases in other circuits
applying the doctrine. See notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
Note, moreover, that the total number of cases in which an agency interpretation
fails at Chevron Step Two is quite small. Reviewing all published Chevron decisions from
the courts of appeals in 2011, Professor Richard Re identified only two instances in which
the court ruled against the agency specifically at Step Two. See Re, 89 Ind L J at 638, 640
(cited in note 5). Professors Kent Barnett and Christopher J. Walker identified fewer than
five Step Two invalidations per year in a review of circuit court cases between 2003 and
2013, with the DC Circuit accounting for less than a fifth of all Chevron cases in the courts
of appeals. See Kent Barnett and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115
Mich L Rev *25-26, 31-32 (forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/DG5V-SH82.
30 Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 16 USC § 1531 et seq.
31 ESA § 3(4), 87 Stat at 885, codified at 16 USC § 1532(6).

2017]

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half

767

possibility of extinction is far off in the future. (Or at least, the
Act arguably does not address that question; more on this below.)
The question is particularly significant with respect to polar
bears, whose very survival may be affected by losses of sea ice
over the next century. 32
The US Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers the
ESA with respect to land animals,33 concluded in a May 2008 final
rule that polar bears are "threatened" but not "endangered."34
(The term "threatened species" in the ESA refers to "any species
which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its
range.")35 While acknowledging that projected changes in future
sea ice conditions pose a danger to the polar bear's survival in the
long run, the Service contended that the "plain language" of the
ESA showed that an "endangered" species must face a "substantial and immediate" risk of extinction, whereas a "threatened"
species is one that faces a "less imminent" danger.36 Shortly after
the Service issued its final rule, complete with this temporal distinction, the Center for Biological Diversity and other environmental groups sued the Service in federal district court in the
District of Columbia for failing to classify polar bears as endangered.37 The environmental groups argued that the Service had
misinterpreted the ESA by reading an imminence requirement
into the definition of endangered.38

32 See Arthur Neslen, Climate Change Is 'Single Biggest Threat' to Polar Bear Survival (The Guardian, Nov 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z57U-EDF5.
33 On the division of responsibility between the Interior Department's Fish and
Wildlife Service and the Commerce Department's National Marine Fisheries Service, see
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v Federal Emergency Management Agency, 126 F3d 461, 470-71 (3d
Cir 1997).
34 Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus
maritimus) throughout Its Range, 73 Fed Reg 28212, 28212 (2008), amending 50 CFR
Part 17.
35 ESA § 3(15), 87 Stat at 886, codified at 16 USC § 1532(20).
36 In re PolarBear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 748 F
Supp 2d 19, 24, 26 (DDC 2010).
37 A number of other plaintiffs, including the state of Alaska and Safari Club
International, sued the Service arguing that polar bears did not meet the definition of
"threatened." Id at 20-21.
38 See Third Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Natural
Resources Defence Council and Greenpeace, Inc, In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act
Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, Misc Action No 08-0764, *28 (DDC filed Mar 13, 2009)
(claiming that "[tlhe Secretary's failure to list the polar bear as 'endangered' was in part
because he "applied the wrong legal standards in making his determination").
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Readers familiar with foundational principles of administrative law might expect that this case would be resolved on the basis
of the Chevron doctrine. And indeed, that is where the district
court began:
The framework for reviewing an agency's interpretation of a
statute that the agency is charged with administering is set
forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. The first step in this review process is for the
court to determine whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.

. .

. If the court concludes that the statute

is either silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise question at issue, the second step of the court's review process is
to determine whether the interpretation proffered by the
agency is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 39
The district court then examined the "text, structure, and
legislative history of the ESA" and determined that "the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue" in the case:
whether an endangered species must be in danger of imminent extinction.40 And recall what the court had just said about Chevron:
if the statute is "silent or ambiguous" on the specific issue, then
the court proceeds to the second step and determines whether
the agency's interpretation of the statute is "permissible." One
might assume, then, that the district court would proceed to the
second step of the Chevron analysis. But that assumption would
be incorrect.
The district court did not reach Chevron Step Two. (Or, at
least, it did not reach Chevron Step Two for another year.) Instead, it said:
Upon finding the definition of an endangered species to be
ambiguous, the Court would normally be required to defer
to any permissible agency construction of the statute under
step two of the Chevron analysis. In this case, however,
there is no permissible construction to which the Court can
defer. . . . [The Fish and Wildlife Service] relies exclusively

on a plain-meaning interpretation of the ESA. As Chevron

39 In re PolarBear, 748 F Supp 2d at 24-25 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
40 Id at 28-29 (quotation marks omitted).
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step 2 deference is reserved for those instances when an
agency recognizes that the Congress's intent is not plain from
the statute's face, this Court is precluded from according the
agency's interpretation deference under Chevron.41
The district court's key analytical move was to say that deference at Chevron Step Two is reserved for instances in which the
agency "recognizes" the ambiguity in the statute. Significantly,
the district court cited no Supreme Court precedent for this proposition.42 Instead, it relied on a DC Circuit precedent, Peter Pan
Bus Lines, Inc v Federal Motor CarrierSafety Administration,43
which itself invoked a line of DC Circuit cases dating back to the
1985 case Prill.44The district court then remanded the case back
to the Fish and Wildlife Service for the agency to decide whether
to adopt the same imminence requirement as a matter of its own
discretion.45
The rest of the story is perhaps predictable. Following the
district court's remand order, the Fish and Wildlife Service submitted a memorandum of "supplemental explanation" stating
that even if the statutory definition of endangered is ambiguous,
it still hewed to the view that the classification should be limited
to species facing an immediate risk of extinction.46 In a section titled
"The Policies and Purposes of the ESA," the Service explained that
"species currently on the brink of extinction ... generally need
stringent protection," which the endangered classification provides.47 But
[flor species not yet on the brink of extinction, particularly
for those that have yet to experience any notable decline in
numbers or range, [the "threatened" classification] offers the
flexibility to fashion restrictions according to the needs of the
species, which reflects the generally longer time frames available to test differing conservation strategies.48
Id at 29 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
See id.
43 471 F3d 1350 (DC Cir 2006). See also In re PolarBear, 748 F Supp 2d at 29, citing
Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1354.
44 Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1354.
45 In re PolarBear, 748 F Supp 2d at 29-30.
46 See generally Memorandum: Supplemental Explanation for the Legal Basis of the
Department's May 15, 2008, Determination of Threatened Status for Polar Bears, In re
PolarBear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, Misc Action No 080764 (DDC filed Dec 22, 2010).
47 Id at *7-8.
48 Id at *8.
41

42
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The case went back to the district court, which concluded that "the
agency's Supplemental Explanation sufficiently demonstrates
that the Service's definition of an endangered species, as applied
to the polar bear, represents a permissible construction of the
ESA and must be upheld under step two of the Chevron framework."49 The DC Circuit upheld the district court's ruling,50 and
the polar bear is still listed as threatened but not endangered.5'
While the outcome of the polar bear post-remand saga may
not be surprising, much else about the story is puzzling. For one:
Why did the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half question arise in the
first place? Why didn't the Fish and Wildlife Service insert a disclaimer in its listing rule along the following lines: "We think the
plain meaning of 'endangered' is that the danger of extinction
must be imminent, but even if we are wrong on that score and the
statute is ambiguous, we would arrive at the same result in the
exercise of our discretion"? This sort of disclaimer does not appear
to be uncommon, 2 and yet the Service omitted it here. Why? It is
49 In re PolarBear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 794 F
Supp 2d 65, 90 (DDC 2011).
50 See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule
Litigation, 709 F3d 1, 3 (DC Cir 2013).
51 Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) (US Fish and Wildlife Service), archived at
http://perma.cc/7ZEG-6RZ9.
52 See, for example, Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Endangered and Threatened Species; Identification of 14 Distinct Population Segments of the Humpback Whale (Megapteranovaeangliae) and Proposed Revision
of Species-Wide Listing, 80 Fed Reg 22304, 22348 (2015), amending 50 CFR Parts 223-24
("To the extent it may be said that the statute is ambiguous as to precisely how the updated listings should replace the original listing in such circumstances, we provide our
interpretation of the statutory scheme."); Department of Veterans Affairs, Health Care for
Homeless Veterans Program, 76 Fed Reg 52575, 52577 (2011), amending 38 CFR Part 63
("Even if the statute is ambiguous, our interpretation that it applies to veterans who are
homeless and have a serious mental illness is consistent with Congress' intent."); Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare
Program; Payment Policies under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to
Part B for CY 2009; E-prescribing Exemption for Computer-Generated Facsimile Transmissions; and Payment for Certain Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics,
and Supplies (DMEPOS), 73 Fed Reg 69726, 69911 (2008), amending various sections of
CFR Title 42 ("First, we continue to believe that our interpretation is consistent with the
plain language of the Medicare statute, and alternatively, if the statute is ambiguous to
this point, we believe our interpretation best captures the Congress' intent and is a reasonable and permissible interpretation."); Department of Health and Human Services,
Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1998 Rates, 63 Fed Reg 26318,
26346 (1998), amending various sections of CFR Title 42:

Taking into consideration the statutory language, the statutory scheme, and
the legislative history, we believe the best reading of the statute enacted by the
Congress is that we should calculate a single number for hospitals within each
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easy to understand how a Step One-and-a-Half issue might arise
if no one had ever thought about this issue before, but the DC
Circuit has been applying this doctrine for three decades. Prill,
after all, was decided in 1985 and has been applied many times
in the intervening years.53 Wouldn't one expect that agencies, after decades of litigation experience, would get the message and
start to insert disclaimers of this sort in their rules as a matter of
course?
And on a normative note: What use does Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half serve? In the polar bear case, did the district court really
anticipate that, on remand, the Fish and Wildlife Service would
say: "Gee, now that we know that the statute is ambiguous, we
think that the term 'endangered' should apply to risks far off in
the future and polar bears should be listed as 'endangered' going
forward"? If the Service had wanted to list polar bears as "endangered," presumably it would have found in the statute the ambiguity so apparent to the district court. Agency officials and lawyers,
after all, are pretty good at searching for ambiguity and, indeed,
are often willing to press aggressive arguments in favor of it.5 So

the district court surely suspected that the statutory interpretation adopted by the agency also reflected the agency's view of the
best policy. Did it warrant an extra round of litigation just so that
the Fish and Wildlife Service would say so in more explicit terms?
Especially in light of this example, we understand why some
readers might conclude that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is nonsense twice over-nonsense in that no sensible agency should
ever find itself ensnared by the doctrine, and nonsense in that the
doctrine itself accomplishes absolutely nothing. And yet we resist
those conclusions. In Part III, we explain why a rational agency
(or rational actors within the agency) might deliberately choose
to argue that a statute is unambiguous without attaching any disclaimer (that is, without arguing in the alternative that even if
the statute is ambiguous, the agency's construction is permissible). And in Part IV, we explain why in our view Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half can produce benefits even if, in the mine-run of
cases, a remand to the agency will result in the agency spitting
back the same rule with cosmetic changes to the preamble. But
class and not apply a wage adjustment. We believe that, in any event, the Secretary's policy is consistent with the statute and is reasonable.

53 See note 29.
54 See, for example, Wachtel v Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F2d 581, 585 (DC Cir
1993) (rejecting the agency's argument in favor of ambiguity as "almost frivolous").
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before doing so, we seek to situate Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
in its doctrinal context.
II. DOCTRINAL ANTECEDENTS OF CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-AHALF

To appreciate Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, it is necessary
to understand three administrative law doctrines (doctrines no
doubt familiar to many readers): Chevron, Securities and Exchange Commission v Chenery Corps5 ("Chenery I"), and Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc v
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.56 We argue that
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is consistent with each of these doctrines but not necessarily dictated by any one of them.
A.

Chevron

Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc
is by most measures the most frequently cited case in administrative law.57 It is certainly the most familiar to administrative law
students.58 And at first blush, it is among the most straightforward. Chevron calls on courts to apply a two-step framework
when reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute that it
administers. The Court in Chevron articulated the two steps as
follows:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the

55

318 US 80 (1943).
463 US 29 (1983).
57 By most measures, but not by all: Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800 (1982), is arguably an "admin law" case, and it has been cited more frequently than Chevron. See Chris
Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court AdministrativeLaw Decisions (Notice & Comment, Oct
9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J26H-QVBW. And if one counts Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc, 509 US 579 (1993), and we don't, Daubert comes out on top.
Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court AdministrativeLaw Decisions (cited in note 57).
58 See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi
Kent L Rev 1253, 1253 (1997) (noting that Chevron "pervades the administrative law
courses and lodges in the consciousness of impressionable students").
56
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court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a per59
missible construction of the statute.
The Court-per Justice Stevens-attempted to justify this
deference in at least three ways: political accountability, comparative expertise, and implied delegation, with the first two being
the most important in Stevens's analysis. As to accountability,
Stevens reasoned that when a statute is ambiguous, it is better
that a politically accountable agency rather than a politically isolated court determine what the statute means.6 0 At the same time
(and, indeed, in the same breath), Stevens emphasized the
agency's expertise relative to judges, who "are not experts in the
field."61 Finally, Stevens (tentatively) advanced the theory that
ambiguity constitutes an "implicit" delegation from Congress to
the relevant agency to "fill [the] gap" in the statutory framework.62

59 Chevron, 467 US at 842-43 (citations omitted).
60

See id at 865-66:

While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
61
Id at 865.
62 Id at 843-44. To be sure, Stevens did not claim that Congress intentionally delegated such gap-filling authority to agencies. Rather, he stated that whether Congress did
so intentionally or not, the Court would still infer such a delegation, presumably so that
the question would be resolved by accountable and expert agencies rather than unelected
and generalist judges. See id at 865:
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance
at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress
was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each
side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For
judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.
Many thus have dubbed this "implied delegation" a legal fiction. See, for example,
John F. Manning, Chevron and the ReasonableLegislator, 128 Harv L Rev 457, 458 (2014).
Today, however, there is more reason to think that Congress legislates against the backdrop of Chevron, see Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside-an Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901, 995-97 (2013), though there is also evidence suggesting
that some members of Congress do not want courts to apply Chevron, see Separation of
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The upshot of the Chevron Court's analysis is a "counter-Marbury"
rule of interpretation: rather than saying "what the law is,"63

courts confronted with ambiguous language should defer to the
"technical expertise and political accountability" of the agency
charged with administering the statute. 64
While Stevens framed the Chevron inquiry in two-step terms,
several scholars have argued that there is a preliminary step implicit in the Chevron analysis, at which the court decides whether
to apply the Chevron framework at all. Professors Merrill and
Hickman have called this "Chevron's 'step zero."'65 Although Step
Zero is complicated (indeed, it may have substeps of its own,
hence the suggestion that Chevron has four steps66), the gist of
this idea is that if Chevron is based (even in part) on a theory of
implied delegation, then it is reasonable to think that there are
some categories of interpretations for which Congress would not
want the agency calling the shots. For example, a court may decline to defer at Step Zero because, as in United States v Mead
Corp,67 the procedures used by the agency were so lacking in formality that it is improbable to think Congress intended the resulting interpretations to receive deference.68 Or a court may deny
deference at Step Zero because, as in Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,69 the policy is so important that it is unlikely that Congress wanted it resolved by an
agency. 70 The latter version of Step Zero recently received a boost
from Chief Justice Roberts in King v Burwell,71 the 2015 case
about whether Affordable Care Act72 tax credits should be available to individuals who enroll in insurance plans through federal

Powers Restoration Act of 2016, HR 4768, 114th Cong, 2d Sess (July 13, 2016) (calling for
de novo review of agency actions). For our purposes, it matters not whether Chevron reflects congressional intent. In either event, Chevron is still a decision of the Supreme Court
entitled to stare decisis weight.
63 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law
Is, 115 Yale L J 2580, 2584 (2006), quoting Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803).
64 Sunstein, 115 Yale L J at 2583 (cited in note 63).
65 See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Georgetown L J at 836 (cited in note 3).
66 See, for example, Jordan, 54 Admin L Rev at 725 (cited in note 4).
67 533 US 218 (2001).
68 Id at 231.
69 529 US 120 (2000).
70 Id at 159-60.
71
135 S Ct 2480 (2015).
72
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
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rather than state-run exchanges.73 Writing for a six-justice majority, the chief justice declined to defer to the Internal Revenue
Service's interpretation of the statute, reasoning that the matter
was of such "deep 'economic and political significance"' and so
"central to this statutory scheme" that "had Congress wished to
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so
expressly."74

One can see how Chevron Step Zero might be derived from
the Court's decision in Chevron. It is not immediately obvious,
though, that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half follows from Chevron
itself. Stevens's opinion in Chevron never suggests that deference
depends on whether an agency recognizes ambiguity in the statute. 75 Chevron simply says that when Congress has delegated interpretive authority to an agency, "a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency."76 Nowhere
does the Court even hint that the administrator of an agency must
recognize that her "reasonable" interpretation is not the only permissible interpretation. While we argue below that Step Oneand-a-Half is consistent with the core purposes of Chevron, it
would be difficult to argue that Step One-and-a-Half is prescribed
by Chevron.
But even if Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cannot be derived
directly from Chevron, new insights about Chevron can indeed be
derived from Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. First, consider the
claim by Professors Stephenson and Vermeule-noted above-that
Chevron has only one step. 77 Stephenson and Vermeule assert

73 King, 135 S Ct at 2485.
?4 Id at 2489, quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v Environmental Protection
Agency, 134 S Ct 2427, 2444 (2014), quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 160.
75 Indeed, one might question whether the agency in Chevron fully acknowledged its
own discretion under the Clean Air Act. See Environmental Protection Agency, Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed Reg 50766, 50767 (1981), amending
40 CFR Parts 51-52:
Congress expressly provided that states are to play the primary role in pollution
control. It also intended that states retain the maximum possible flexibility to
balance environmental and economic concerns in designing plans to clean up
nonattainment areas. Today's action follows this mandate by allowing states
much greater flexibility in developing their nonattainment area NSR programs
and attainment demonstrations.
(citations omitted).
76 Chevron, 467 US at 844.
77 See generally Stephenson and Vermeule, 95 Va L Rev 597 (cited in note 5).
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that the "single question" in every Chevron case is "whether the
agency's construction is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation."78 For at least a fleeting moment, the Supreme Court
seemed in accord with Stephenson and Vermeule's one-step formulation.79 More recent Supreme Court opinions, however, describe Chevron in two-step terms. 80 What Chevron Step One-anda-Half teaches us is that, at least in any court that applies the
doctrine, the difference between Step One and Step Two very
much matters. A court may believe that an agency's interpretation of a statute is permissible and yet still flunk the agency on
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds because the agency failed
to describe its interpretation in Step Two terms. In this respect,
Chevron does indeed have (at least) two steps-and any agency
that disagrees will have its hat handed to it in the DC Circuit.
Not only does the existence of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
demonstrate that Stephenson and Vermeule's consolidation of the
Chevron inquiry fails to fit with DC Circuit doctrine, but it also
offers direction for the order in which the inquiry should occur.
Professor Richard Re has argued that courts should have the option of proceeding with the Chevron inquiry in reverse:
"[O]ptional two-step Chevron would first ask the reasonableness
question, and then it would give courts discretion to ask a second
question regarding mandatoriness."81 Re further argued that the

Id at 599.
See Entergy Corp v Riverkeeper, Inc, 556 US 208, 218 n 4 (2009) ("[S]urely if
Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting
what Congress has said would be unreasonable.").
80 See Encino Motorcars, LLC v Navarro, 136 S Ct 2117, 2124 (2016):
78
79

In the usual course, when an agency is authorized by Congress to issue regulations
and promulgates a regulation interpreting a statute it enforces, the interpretation
receives deference if the statute is ambiguous and if the agency's interpretation is
reasonable. This principle is implemented by the two-step analysis set forth in
Chevron.
See also King, 135 S Ct at 2488-89 ("When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron. . . . In extraordinary
cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation. This is one of those cases.") (quotation marks, citation,
and paragraph break omitted). Note, though, that in both of these cases, the Court ultimately declined to apply the Chevron framework, resolving the matter at what might be
described as Chevron Step Zero, see Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps)Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 Pepperdine L Rev 56, 57, or Chevron Step 0.5, see
Daniel Hemel and Michael Pollack, Chevron Step 0.5 (Whatever Source Derived, June
23, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/M4M2-WM7P (discussing Encino Motorcars).
81 Re, 89 Ind L J at 619 (cited in note 5).
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optional two-step formulation of Chevron is consistent with current practice in the federal courts of appeals.82 Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half suggests that, at least in the DC Circuit, courts do not
have the option of resolving Chevron cases on Step Two grounds
alone-at least not in cases in which the court ultimately upholds
the agency's interpretation. If a petitioner or plaintiff seeking review of an agency rule brings a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
challenge in the DC Circuit or DC federal district court, the appellate panel or district judge does not have the option of holding
that the agency's interpretation is reasonable and calling it a day.
To respond to the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half challenge, the
panel would have to determine whether the agency acknowledged
ambiguity in the statute; if not, then the panel or district judge
would have to determine whether the agency's characterization of
the statute as unambiguous is correct. To be sure, an agency that
jumps straight to Step Two without expressing any opinion on the
statute's ambiguity (or lack thereof) might survive Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half (more on this in Part V.A). But a court that jumps
straight to Step Two in a case in which a Step One-and-a-Half
challenge has been raised would be acting inconsistently with DC
Circuit doctrine.
B.

Chenery I

Four decades Chevron's senior, the Chenery I rule is another
"hoary principle of administrative law."83 And like Chevron, the
Chenery I rule is easy to state but not always to apply: when a
court reviews an agency decision, "[t]he grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the
record discloses that its action was based."84 In other words, if the
agency proffers a bad reason for its decision, a court will not uphold the decision just because the agency could have offered a
good reason. In fact, this rule applies even if the agency's own
lawyers later offer that very good reason to the court during judicial review.85 Instead, so long as the agency has any discretion in

82

Id at 641.

83 National Association of Home Builders v Defenders of Wildlife, 551 US 644, 684
(2007) (Stevens dissenting). See also generally Kevin M. Stack, The ConstitutionalFoundations of Chenery, 116 Yale L J 952 (2007) (emphasizing the constitutional significance
of the doctrine).
84 Chenery I, 318 US at 87.
85 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review,
98 Harv L Rev 505,
526 n 106 (1985), quoting American Textile ManufacturersInstitute, Inc v Donovan, 452
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the matter (for there is no reason to remand otherwise86), what
counts is what the agency said at the time of its decision.
The facts of Chenery I provide a good example of how this
works. In Chenery I, a company proposed a reorganization. The
Securities and Exchange Commission agreed to allow the reorganization, "but also ordered that 'preferred stock' acquired by
certain 'officers, directors, and controlling stockholders' while reorganization plans were before the Commission could not 'participate in the reorganization on an equal footing with all other preferred stock."'87 The SEC justified its decision by invoking
common-law principles as articulated by courts. The Supreme
Court concluded, however, that the common-law principles relied
on by the SEC were inapplicable to this situation-the agency
misunderstood the common law.88 Instead of deciding whether the
agency's decision could be sustained on other grounds, the Court
remanded to the agency. 89 (Much like in the polar bear litigation,
the agency responded on remand with new justifications for its
old position, and the Supreme Court upheld the agency's decision
the second time around.)90
The Chenery I principle is often invoked in modern administrative law (though not quite as often invoked as Chevron).91 It
played a prominent role in Michigan v Environmental Protection
Agency,92 a 2015 decision in which the Supreme Court rejected
EPA's claim that it could regulate mercury emissions from coal
power plants.93 The DC Circuit likewise invokes Chenery I on a
US 490, 539 (1981) ("A corollary of this rule is that 'the post hoc rationalizations' of the
agency or its counsel 'cannot serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action."').
86 See, for example, Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc v Public Utility DistrictNo 1
of Snohomish County, 554 US 527, 544-45 (2008):
We will not uphold a discretionary agency decision where the agency has offered
a justification in court different from what it provided in its opinion. But FERC
has lucked out: The Chenery doctrine has no application to these cases, because
we conclude that the Commission was required [to act as it did].
(citation omitted).
87 Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 Georgetown L J 943, 958 (2017),
quoting Chenery 1, 318 US at 81.
88 See Chenery I, 318 US at 89-90.
89 Id at 95.
90 See Securities & Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp, 332 US 194, 199, 209
(1947) ("Chenery II"). See also Nielson, 105 Georgetown L J at 959-60 (cited in note 87).
91 Walker, Most Cited Supreme CourtAdministrative Law Decisions (cited in note 57).
92
135 S Ct 2699 (2015).
93 See id at 2710 ("This line of reasoning contradicts the foundational principle of
administrative law that a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that the
agency invoked when it took the action."). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc
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regular basis when an agency puts forth a new rationale for an
action in litigation that the agency did not cite in the first instance. 94 To be sure, as noted above, Chenery I does not require a
remand when the agency's decision is the only one the law allows,
and sometimes (though rarely) an agency may offer a post hoc
justification.95 But as a general rule, Chenery I requires an
agency's decision to clear two hurdles: it must be lawful and the
reason why it is lawful must be the one given by the agency itself
at the time it announced the decision. Otherwise, the decision
cannot stand, even if the same outcome could be permissible.
On one view, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is simply an application of Chenery J.96 If an agency initially says that it is adopting a particular position because it believes that the statute so
requires, a court cannot uphold the agency's action on the ground
that the statute is ambiguous but the agency's interpretation is
permissible. The agency, after all, gave the "wrong" reason for its
decision.
Yet the path from Chenery Ito Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
may not be quite that straightforward, depending on how broadly
one reads Chenery I. Consider again the polar bear example. Imagine two potential arguments that the Fish and Wildlife Service
could make in the preamble to its listing rule:
(a) Congress clearly intended for the term "endangered" to include an imminence requirement. The legislative history says
that Congress sought to establish "two levels of protection""endangered" and "threatened"-with the two levels distinguished by whether the danger of extinction is "imminent."97
(b) The text of the ESA is ambiguous as to whether "endangered" includes an imminence requirement. Nonetheless, we

v Volpe, 401 US 402, 420 (1971) (stating that "post hoc rationalization[s] ... must be
viewed critically") (quotation marks omitted).
94 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Southwest Regional Council
of Carpenters,826 F3d 460, 465 (DC Cir 2016) ("Even if the Board had explained the relevance of these alleged factual differences, we cannot address this argument because it did
not appear in the Board's orders below.").
95 See, for example, Camp v Pitts, 411 US 138, 142-43 (1973) (per curiam) (allowing
post hoc justifications when "there was such failure to explain administrative action as to
frustrate effective judicial review"). But see FloridaPower & Light Co v Lorion, 470 US
729, 744 (1985) (concluding that, even in such circumstances, remanding the case is often
preferable).
96 This was certainly the view of the majority in Prill itself. See Prill, 755 F2d at 948
("We think that the teachings of Chenery are plainly implicated in this case.").
97 Endangered Species Act of 1973, S Rep No 93-307, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1973).
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believe that such a requirement best carries out congressional intent. The legislative history says that Congress
sought to establish "two levels of protection"-"endangered"
and "threatened"-with the two levels distinguished by
whether the danger of extinction is "imminent."98
Assume, for present purposes, that the court considers legislative history to be a relevant consideration, at least at Chevron
Step Two.99 Would there really be a Chenery I problem with upholding the agency's listing decision, whether the agency's proffered rationale is (a) or (b)? In both scenarios, the agency has cited
the legislative history as a reason for its decision, and so
Chenery I (arguably0o0) allows the court to rely on that reason on
review. And yet in scenario (a), the agency might well run into a
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half problem. Unlike in scenario (b), the
agency in scenario (a) does not acknowledge ambiguity. Quite the
contrary, the agency maintains that congressional intent is clear.
To be sure, the agency relies on legislative history rather than statutory text, but the DC Circuit has said under similar circumstances
that if an agency does not acknowledge ambiguity, then it is undeserving of Chevron deference.'01
To put the point in slightly different terms, imagine an
agency says, "The statute unambiguously means X for reasons A,
B, and C." Chenery I clearly prevents the agency from pivoting in
litigation and arguing that the statute should be interpreted to
mean X for reasons D, E, and F. It is not so obvious, though, that
Chenery I stands in the way of a court saying: "We believe that
the statute is ambiguous, but reasons A, B, and C are all perfectly
Id.
99 See, for example, Fournierv Sebelius, 718 F3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir 2013) (holding
that, at Chevron Step Two, "legislative history permissibly may be considered").
100 Of course, one could read Chenery I in a more maximalist fashion, such that scenario (a) would not be upheld because the agency did not acknowledge its discretion, just
as if the agency had not acknowledged its discretion for reasons that do not sound in statutory interpretation. Even though the agency said its reading was consistent with the
legislative history, by definition it could have reached another result despite the legislative
history. Otherwise, this could not be a Chevron Step Two case. It is enough here to observe
that it is not obvious that Chenery I should be read in such a maximalist fashion, though
for what it is worth, one of the authors (Nielson) subscribes to a maximalist view, while
the other (Hemel) is not yet persuaded. Perhaps tellingly, courts also appear to vary
widely on how they understand Chenery L See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 306-07 (cited
in note 12).
101 See PDK LaboratoriesInc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362
F3d 786, 794 (DC Cir 2004) (refusing to grant Chevron deference when an agency official
"cited 'the legislative history' of the statute in question "[a]s one of his reasons for thinking the statute clear").
98

2017]

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half

781

good reasons for interpreting the statute to mean X, and so we
affirm the agency." That latter disposition may or may not be consistent with Chenery I, depending on how broadly one reads
Chenery I. But no matter how one reads Chenery I, the latter justification would definitely run afoul of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half.
C.

State Farm

If Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is not implicit in Chevron
and is not (necessarily) required by Chenery I, might it be derived
from the State Farm doctrine? State Farm holds that an agency
must "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action"-it
must show, in other words, that its action was "the product of reasoned decisionmaking."12 Perhaps we can say that an agency
flunks the "satisfactory explanation" requirement-and therefore regulates unreasonably-when it says that the statute is unambiguous even though the statute is susceptible to multiple
meanings.
Maybe-but we are doubtful. The fact that an agency thinks
Congress's intent is clear while the court thinks the statute is ambiguous does not mean that the agency's view is unreasonable. As
we allude to above, some courts consider legislative history at
Chevron Step One: on this view, legislative history can render a
statute unambiguous under certain circumstances.103 Others consider legislative history only at Step Two.104 An agency and a court
might disagree as to whether to resolve a statutory interpretation
question at Step One or Step Two, but that does not mean that
either holds an unreasonable view, much less that the agency has
employed a faulty process or ignored key parts of the problem.
More generally, one can conceptualize statutory clarity as a
spectrum (say, from zero to one, with zero being totally ambiguous and one being completely clear).105 The statute specifying that
presidential elections must be held "on the Tuesday next after the
State Farm, 463 US at 43, 52.
See, for example, National ElectricalManufacturersAssociation v United States
Department of Energy, 654 F3d 496, 504-05 (4th Cir 2011) ("[W]e have described legislative history as one of the traditional tools of interpretation to be consulted at Chevron's
step one.").
104 See, for example, Village of Barrington, Illinois v Surface TransportationBoard,
636 F3d 650, 666 (DC Cir 2011) ("Although we would be uncomfortable relying on such
legislative history at Chevron step one, we think it may appropriately guide an agency in
interpreting an ambiguous statute.").
105 For a similar take, see Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2137-38 (cited
in note 8).
102
103
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first Monday in November"106 might qualify as a 0.99 on the scale,
while the Federal Communications Commission's power over assignment of station licenses (such assignments are allowed if the
Commission determines "the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served"107) might land at 0.01. We might further
imagine that any statutory provision 0.5 or higher is "unambiguous" for Chevron purposes (that is, the case will be resolved at
Step One), and any statutory provision below 0.5 on the clarity
scale is "ambiguous" (that is, the case can proceed to Step Two).
We might also imagine that intelligent interpreters acting in good
faith will sometimes differ in their assessments, at least over a
limited range. For instance, one might rate a provision a 0.3 on
the clarity scale while another equally intelligent, equally wellintentioned interpreter might rate the same provision a 0.2 or a
0.4 (though probably not a 0.9).
From this perspective, an agency's statement that a statutory
provision is unambiguous may sometimes show that the agency's
decision is not the "product of reasoned decisionmaking,"08 but
not always. It might be unreasonable for the FCC to say its license
assignment power is unambiguous. But an agency might reasonably conclude that a statutory provision is a 0.51 while the court
sees it as a 0.49. In the latter scenario, the agency would have a
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half problem (assuming it does not insert the requisite disclaimer), but there would be no obvious State
Farm issue. To be sure, we are not saying that 0.5 is the right
threshold, nor that such fine distinctions are necessarily possible.
The important point is that an agency's decision can be the product of "reasoned decisionmaking," the hallmark of State Farm, yet
still fail Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half.
Granted, there are affinities between Chevron Step-One-anda-Half and State Farm: both doctrines look to the content of an
agency's explanation for adopting a particular position. But not
every case in which the agency runs into a Chevron Step-Oneand-a-Half problem is also a case in which the agency would flunk
State Farm review (and, of course, vice versa).

106 3 USC § 1. Or so we would think. Perhaps one might argue that "the Tuesday next"
means "next Tuesday" as opposed to "this Tuesday," so if the first Monday in November is
November 7, then "the Tuesday next" is November 15.
107 47 USC § 310(d).
108 State Farm, 463 US at 52.
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Prill

Despite not being compelled by Chevron, Chenery I, or State
Farm, Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half is a firmly entrenched principle of DC Circuit law. Its origin is traceable at least as far back
as the DC Circuit's 1985 decision in Prill, which announced the
following rule:
[A]n agency regulation must be declared invalid, even though
the agency might be able to adopt the regulation in the exercise of its discretion, if it was not based on the agency's own
judgment but rather on the unjustified assumption that it
was Congress' judgment that such a regulation is desirable.109
In operation, this means the court will "strike[] down an
agency interpretation, not because the interpretation was inconsistent with the statute, but because the agency wrongly assumed
that a particular interpretation was commanded by the statute.""o Thus, "[d]eference to an agency's statutory interpretation
'is only appropriate when the agency has exercised its own judgment,' not when it believes that interpretation is compelled by
Congress.""'
The troubling facts of Prill illustrate the doctrine. A truck
driver named Kenneth Prill was fired for complaining "about the
unsafe condition of a company truck and trailer."112 Even though
the truck was unsafe (indeed, state officials agreed with him),
Prill was let go "because company officials decided that they could
not have him 'calling the cops all the time."'113 Upset, Prill sought
relief from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging
that his firing was an unfair labor practice.11 4 Relevant here, an
109 Prill, 755 F2d at 948 (quotation marks and brackets omitted), quoting Planned
ParenthoodFederation of America, Inc v Heckler, 712 F2d 650, 666 (DC Cir 1983) (Bork
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110 Stuart Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to Do about Statutory Challenges, 55
Admin L Rev 427, 472 (2003). See also Charles H. Koch Jr, JudicialReview of Administrative Discretion, 54 Geo Wash L Rev 469, 482 n 54 (1986):

[T]he court found that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) failed to recognize that the broad standard conferred executing discretion and that the
NLRB acted improperly by not exercising it.... [T]he court was perfectly correct
in instructing the agency of the boundaries of that discretion and compelling it
to exercise that discretion according to the breadth of the legislative standard.

1 Arizona v Thompson, 281 F3d 248, 254 (DC Cir 2002), quoting PhillipsPetroleum
Co v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 792 F2d 1165, 1169 (DC Cir 1986).
112 Prill, 755 F2d at 942.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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administrative law judge agreed that Prill's safety complaint was
protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act15 (NLRA)
as a "concerted activit[y],"116 but the NLRB disagreed because, on
its view of the NLRA, "an employee's conduct is not 'concerted' unless it is 'engaged in with or on the authority of other employees,
and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself."'117
This issue then came to the DC Circuit, which concluded that
the NLRB was wrong to say that it lacked discretion to consider
Prill's activity "concerted." The agency, however, urged that its
decision rejecting Prill's position should nonetheless be upheld because the NLRB has "broad authority to construe the NLRA."118
The DC Circuit would have none of it, explaining that "judicial
deference is not accorded a decision of the NLRB when the Board
acts pursuant to an erroneous view of law and, as a consequence,
fails to exercise the discretion delegated to it by Congress."119 Because the NLRB was wrong to conclude that its interpretation of
the statute was "mandated"by the statute,1 20 the court remanded
"under the principles of [Chenery I], so that the Board may reconsider the scope of 'concerted activities' under section 7."121 Because
the agency's mistake might have had some "bearing on the procedure used or the substance of decision reached," the NLRB's decision could not stand.122
Prill,which was argued and decided just months after Chevron,
never cites Stevens's now-canonical opinion; in subsequent cases,
however, the DC Circuit has made the link between Chevron and
Prill clearer. An illustrative example is Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc
v Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Peter Pan concerned two competing budget bus lines: Peter Pan Bus Lines and
49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq.
See 29 USC § 157 ("Employees shall have the right ... to engage in [ concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.").
117 Prill, 755 F2d at 942.

115
116

118

Id.

119 Id.

120 Id at 948 (concluding, inter alia, "that the Board erred in assuming that the NLRA
mandates its present interpretation of 'concerted activities').
121 Prill, 755 F2d at 942 (citation omitted).
122 Id at 948. See also PhillipsPetroleum, 792 F2d at 1169 ("This deference, however,
is only appropriate when the agency has exercised its own judgment. When, instead, the
agency's decision is based on an erroneous view of the law, its decision cannot stand."). On
remand, the NLRB adhered to its position that Prill's activity was not "concerted": it
acknowledged that its interpretation of the NLRA "is not actually required by the NLRA
but rather is most responsive to the central purposes for which the Act was created." Prill
v National Labor Relations Board, 835 F2d 1481, 1483 (DC Cir 1987) (quotation marks
omitted). The DC Circuit affirmed the NLRB's ruling the second time around. Id at 1482.
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Fung Wah Transportation, Inc (known to a generation of East
Coast college students as "the Chinatown bus"). Fung Wah filed an
application with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) for a license to operate a passenger bus line between
New York and Boston.123 Peter Pan objected to Fung Wah's application because, Peter Pan said, "Fung Wah was unwilling or unable to comply with the requirements of the regulations [the Department of Transportation] has promulgated under the
Americans With Disabilities Act."124 The agency, however, concluded that the licensing statute did not allow it to consider Fung
Wah's alleged Americans with Disabilities Act125 (ADA) violations
as part of the licensing proceeding.126
As in Prill, the DC Circuit disagreed with the agency's view
of the stIatute.12 7 In the court's view, the licensing statute did not
unambiguously preclude the FMCSA from considering the ADA
violations as part of the licensing proceeding. As Judge Karen
LeCraft Henderson wrote for the panel:
Under the Chevron two-step, we stop the music at step one if
the Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.

...

But if the statute is silent or ambiguous, we dance

on and, at step two, defer to the Commission's interpretation
if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute....
In rejecting Peter Pan's argument that [the licensing statute
allowed for consideration of alleged ADA violations], the
FMCSA unequivocally declared: "This interpretation is not
consistent with the plain language of the statute and the leg-

.

islative history." . . . To the contrary, we find the text of the

statute to be ambiguous... . We therefore cannot uphold the
FMCSA's interpretation under step 1 of Chevron. Nor may
we review it under step 2..

.

. We must therefore remand for

the FMCSA to interpret the statutory language anew. 128

Peter Pan may be the clearest statement of how the Chevron
Step-One-and-a-Half doctrine fits into the broader Chevron
framework. In terms of its outcome, however, Peter Pan is not an
outlier. To the contrary, the DC Circuit regularly invokes Prill
123
124
125

Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1352.
Id at 1351-52.
Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 USC

§

et seq.
126
127
128

See Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1352-53.
See id at 1353-55.
Id at 1353-54 (brackets, paragraph breaks, and quotation marks omitted).
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and its progeny in Chevron cases-or at least relatively regularly.
As Professor Bagley has noted, "[e]xamples abound" of the DC
Circuit applying (and, in Bagley's view, misapplying) the Prill
framework.129
Other courts have also recognized Chevron Step-One-and-aHalf-including arguably the US Supreme Court. In Negusie v
Holder, the justices confronted the "persecutor bar" in immigration law, which precludes anyone from receiving refugee status
who has "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."130 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), following what
it believed judicial precedent to require, concluded "that the persecutor bar applies even if the alien's assistance in persecution
was coerced or otherwise the product of duress."131 Although
agreeing that the BIA would be eligible for Chevron deference on
this question in the ordinary course, the Supreme Court did not
defer to the agency's interpretation because, contrary to the
agency's claim, the question was not foreclosed by judicial precedent.1 32 Before the Supreme Court, lawyers for the BIA argued
that even if the agency's interpretation was not mandated, it was
at least "reasonable and thus controlling."133 Justice Anthony
Kennedy, however, writing for the Court, rejected the applicability of Chevron, using language reminiscent of Chevron Step-Oneand-a-Half: "The BIA deemed its interpretation to be mandated[,]
and that error prevented it from a full consideration of the
...
statutory question here presented."134 With a favorable citation to
the DC Circuit, the Court remanded to "[t]he agency [to] confront
the same question free of this mistaken legal premise."135
Negusie goes a fair bit of the way toward establishing Chevron
Step-One-and-a-Half as the law of the (entire) land. But it does
129 Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 300 & n 326 (cited in note 12) (providing examples).
See also note 29 (providing more examples).
130 8 USC § 1101(a)(42).
131 Negusie, 555 US at 514.
132 See id at 517-18.
133 Id at 521, quoting Brief for the Respondent, Negusie v Mukasey, Docket No 07-499,
*11 (US filed Aug 15, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 3851621).
134 Negusie, 555 US at 521.
135 Id at 516. See also id at 523, quoting Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc v
FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission, 924 F2d 1132, 1136 (DC Cir 1991) ("If an agency
erroneously contends that Congress' intent has been clearly expressed and has rested on
that ground, we remand to require the agency to consider the question afresh in light of
the ambiguity we see.") (brackets omitted).
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not go all of the way. For one thing, the context of Negusie was
peculiar. The agency did not engage in statutory interpretation as
much as it engaged in judicial-decision interpretation. That may
present a different type of analysis (whether it should is a question
for another day). Likewise, Negusie's analysis is quite cursory. If
the Court was, in fact, adopting Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half, it
did not really explain why it was making such an important doctrinal move, much less did it explain the scope of the doctrine.
Given this cursory analysis, it is hardly surprising that lower
courts do not appear to have taken the justices' hint, if in fact the
justices were giving such a hint.136
Indeed, Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half has not been adopted
everywhere-even after Negusie. For instance, it appears that
neither the Second nor the Third Circuit has "yet addressed the
question of whether [Chevron] deference is only appropriate when
the agency has exercised its own judgment, not when it believes
that its interpretation is compelled by Congress."137 Before Negusie,
the Sixth Circuit deferred to the Department of Agriculture at
Chevron Step Two even while holding that the Department had

136 The Supreme Court arguably indicated its endorsement of the
Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half doctrine long before Negusie, in Federal Communications Commission v RCA
Communications, Inc, 346 US 86 (1953). The relevant statute directed the Federal
Communications Commission to grant radio licenses whenever it "shall determine that
public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the granting thereof." Radio
Act of 1927 § 11, 44 Stat 1162, 1167. The Commission took the position that "competition
is in the public interest where competition is reasonably feasible." RCA Communications,
346 US at 89 (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court ordered a lower court to remand
the matter to the Commission. As Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote for the Court, "[T]he
Commission professed to dispose of the case merely upon its view of a principle which it
derived from the statute and did not base its conclusion on matters within its own special
competence." Id at 91. Because the Court did not think that the statute unambiguously
stood for the principle that the Commission had derived, the Court ordered the Commission
to reconsider its licensing decision, bringing its "own experience" to bear. Id at 91, 98.
The Supreme Court's decision in RCA Communicationshas all the essential features
of a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand: the agency professed that the statute was unambiguous; the Court concluded that the agency in fact enjoyed discretion; and so the
Court remanded the matter to the agency for a do-over. Yet RCA Communications preceded Chevron by more than three decades. To call it the genesis of the Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half doctrine might be placing the cart before the horse. At the very least, though,
RCA Communications suggests that the rule articulated in Prill has antecedents that extend much further back than Prill-indeed, much further back than Chevron itself.
137 Martinez v Attorney General of United States, 693 F3d 408, 412
(3d Cir 2012) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). See also Murray v UBS Securities, LLC, 2013 WL
2190084, *6 (SDNY) ("The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether
deference is only appropriate when the agency has exercised its own judgment, not when
it believes that its interpretation is compelled by Congress.") (quotation marks and
brackets omitted).
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incorrectly concluded that its interpretation was compelled by
Congress.138 The Seventh Circuit seemed to take a different approach before Negusie: after holding that the BIA had incorrectly
concluded it lacked discretion, the Seventh Circuit did not remand the case to the BIA but instead decided the issue itself de
novo.1 39 Post-Negusie, the Seventh Circuit has not decided
whether this remains good law. The Ninth Circuit appeared to
adopt the doctrine in a 2013 case, but has not applied it since.40
And the Tenth and Federal Circuits have cited DC Circuit case
law to the effect that an agency is ineligible for deference at
Chevron Step Two if it believes that the statute is clear, though
those courts have yet to remand a case on Step One-and-a-Half
grounds.141
III. THE PUZZLE OF CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF

In the previous Part, we discussed the murky doctrinal origins
of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. An even more perplexing puzzle
is why these cases continue to crop up. The first few Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half cases are easy enough to account for: in Prilland
other early cases, the agency might not have known what was
coming. But it is not 1985 anymore. Over time, we should expect
138 See LansingDairy, Inc v Espy, 39 F3d 1339, 1354-55 (6th Cir 1994) ("Because, as
discussed above, the language of the Act and the legislative history are not unambiguous
and the Secretary's interpretation is neither unreasonable nor in conflict with Congress'
intent, we are bound by Chevron to uphold the Secretary's interpretation.").
139 See Escobar Barrazav Mukasey, 519 F3d 388, 391 (7th Cir 2008):

[W]e do not give any special weight to the agency's construction.... That's not
because we think the statute unambiguous.... But the Board (acting by a single
member) asserted that the statute is clear, and by forswearing any exercise of
administrative discretion the Board also disabled its counsel from invoking the
principle of Chevron.
But see Madison Gas & Electric Co v United States Environmental ProtectionAgency, 25
F3d 526, 529 (7th Cir 1994):
The EPA knows more about it than we do and under Chevron has the primary
responsibility for interpreting undefined terms. But it has not furnished a reasoned ground for denying these utilities' requests for additional allowances and
it therefore must, if it wants to adhere to its denial, try again.
140 Gila River Indian Community v United States, 729 F3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir 2013)
("We conclude that the Secretary's interpretation warrants no deference because it rests
on a mistaken conclusion that the language has a plain meaning.").
141

See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1592 v Federal Labor

Relations Authority, 836 F3d 1291, 1295-96 (10th Cir 2016), citing PDK Laboratories,362
F3d at 798, and PeterPan, 471 F3d at 1354; National Organizationof Veterans'Advocates,
Inc v Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 314 F3d 1373, 1378-79 (Fed Cir 2003), citing Transitional Hospitals Corp of Louisiana, Inc v Shalala, 222 F3d 1019, 1029 (DC Cir 2000).
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agencies to become accustomed to Step One-and-a-Half and to
write their rules and orders to avoid being tripped up by the doctrine. After all, sometimes it may not take much effort to insulate
a decision from any Chevron Step One-a-and-Half problem-a
disclaimer combined with some analysis of why the agency's interpretation is good policy may be enough.142
And yet far from falling into desuetude, Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half remains a vital doctrine-at least in the DC Circuit
and the DC federal district court (with rarer appearances beyond143). What might account for the continued appearance of

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases more than thirty years after
Prill? Why haven't agencies adapted by writing their rules with
an eye toward sidestepping any potential Chevron Step One-anda-Half issues?144

To be sure, some have. Sometimes an agency will argue that
its reading is compelled by the statute while adding-in the alternative-that it would reach the same conclusion as a matter of
discretion.145 Yet this practice, while apparently not uncommon,
is not universal. And while the costs of drafting such a disclaimer
are nonzero (especially because an agency may still run into a
State Farm problem if it fails to justify its policy choice), an
agency can circumvent Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as long as it
clearly states that it would adopt the same policy even if it had
another option.
Setting the drafting costs aside, why else might an agency
say that its decision is compelled by Congress, without also saying

142 See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency, Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed Reg 31514, 31528 (2010),
amending various sections of CFR Title 40 ("We believe that this approach is both compelled by the statute and reflects the preferable policy approach."); Local Union 1261,
District 22, United Mine Workers of America v Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission, 917 F2d 42, 43 (DC Cir 1990) (upholding an agency decision despite disagreement over whether the statute was "clear" because the agency also "adequately stated the
practical and policy considerations ultimately motivating its interpretation").
143 See text accompanying notes 140-41.
144 We refer to "rules" in text but note that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half applies
with
equal force to agency statutory interpretations in adjudicative proceedings. See, for example, Alarm Industry Communications Committee v Federal Communications Commission,
131 F3d 1066, 1072 (DC Cir 1997); City of Los Angeles Department of Airports v United
States Department of Transportation, 103 F3d 1027, 1034 (DC Cir 1997); Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co v Interstate Commerce Commission, 826 F2d 1125, 1129 (DC Cir 1987).
145 See note 52.
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that it would reach the same result as an exercise of discretion?
We suggest six hypotheses.146
A.

Agency Ignorance

Perhaps the likeliest answer is that, more than thirty years
after Prill, many agency lawyers remain unaware of the Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half doctrine. They probably would not have
learned about it in law school, even if they graduated after the
doctrine emerged in the mid-1980s. After all, no mention of Prill
appears in leading administrative law casebooks.147 While survey
evidence indicates that agency drafters are generally aware of
Chevron, their knowledge of other administrative law doctrines is
not nearly as widespread (for example, 39 percent of drafters surveyed said they were unaware of Mead, and 47 percent said they
were unaware of Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co148 I Auer v
Robbins49).15o We have no similar data with respect to Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half, but we expect that in at least some cases,
the agency lawyers drafting rules and orders are simply unaware
of the doctrine. Ignorance, however, is a less likely explanation
for agencies that appear regularly before the DC Circuit.
B.

Agency Ambivalence

Another possibility is that agency leaders-or the lawyers
who work under them-genuinely believe that the relevant statutory provision is unambiguous but are less than enthusiastic
about that result as a policy matter. To return to the polar bear
example, Fish and Wildlife Service officials might believe that the
term "endangered" implies an imminent risk of extinction, but the
officials might wish to list the polar bear as an endangered species

146 Chevron Step One-and-a-Half can be applied to both agency rulemakings and
agency adjudications-it applies whenever an agency does not recognize that it has interpretative discretion. For purposes of this Article, our analysis does not turn on this distinction. In the future, however, this may be a fruitful avenue of research. For instance,
perhaps agencies are more "strategic" in rulemakings than adjudications, or vice versa.
Such questions, while important, are beyond the scope of this Article.
147 See generally Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy:
Problems, Text, and Cases (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 7th ed 2011); Jerry L.
Mashaw, et al, Administrative Law: The American PublicLaw System; Cases and Materials
(West Academic 7th ed 2014).
148 325 US 410 (1945).
149 519 US 452 (1997).
150 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation,67 Stan L Rev
999, 1019 (2015).
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if they could. Alternatively, agency officials might believe that the
term "endangered" implies imminence but might be uncertain as
to how they would resolve the issue if freed from statutory shackles. In either scenario, agency officials might decide to argue that
the term "endangered" unambiguously means imminent risk of
extinction, and if a reviewing court decides otherwise, then they
will reverse (or at least reconsider) their position if and when they
have to.
The first version of the "ambivalence" story-agency officials
believe the statute unambiguously means X but wish they could
do Y-strikes us as a strained explanation for the continued appearance of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases. Let's say that the
statutory provision either (i) unambiguously means X or (ii) is
ambiguous and could mean X or Y. Let's also say that agency officials would prefer result Y. If there is a credible argument that
the statute is ambiguous, then we would expect agency officials
who desire result Y to make that argument. For this first version
of the ambivalence story to be true, there would have to be an
argument as to why the statutory provision is ambiguous that the
court recognizes but the agency officials do not. This is not impossible-agency officials sometimes overlook viable arguments in
their favor-but we have trouble believing that this a frequent
reason for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands. In a world in
which agency officials are able to spot "ambiguities" that courts
reject as nonexistent or borderline frivolous,151 it is more than a
bit strange to think that agency officials are unable to spot ambiguities that support the agency's preferred policy and that the reviewing court can nonetheless identify.
Note, moreover, that in the first scenario-agency officials believe that the statute unambiguously means X but wish it were
not so-the agency has an option other than simply failing to argue in the alternative. The agency can say, "We think the statute
unambiguously means X, but we think that Y is the better policy."
Indeed, one can find quite a few examples in the Federal Register
of agencies taking this tack.152 This is similar to what judges do

151 See, for example, Alarm Industry Communications Committee, 131 F3d at
1068
(rejecting an agency interpretation as "senseless").
152 See, for example, Library of Congress, Copyright Office, Copyright
Arbitration
Royalty Panels, 59 Fed Reg 63025, 63032 (1994), amending various sections of CFR Title 37 ("The method of payment of the CARPs is a problem, especially given our lack of
statutory authority to pay the arbitrators directly. Unfortunately, the legislative solution
discussed in the Interim Regulations ... failed for this Congress."); National Credit Union
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when they criticize a law but state that they nonetheless must
apply it.153 Agencies, to be sure, sometimes may be reluctant to

play the blame game for fear of irritating Congress. But if the
agency feels strongly that it is being forced to act against the public interest, it can say so. It is perhaps telling that we can find no
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half case in which an agency says that
it is acting contrary to its view of the public interest because it
believes Congress has mandated that result and a reviewing court
then concludes that the statute is in fact ambiguous.
The second version of the "ambivalence" story-agency officials believe that the statute unambiguously means X but have
yet to decide whether they would choose X or Y if freed from statutory constraints-seems more plausible. This is especially true
once we remember that "agencies are a 'they,' not an 'it."'154 For

example, the agency's general counsel might take the view that

Administration, Truth in Savings, 58 Fed Reg 50394, 50430 (1993), amending various sections of CFR Title 12:
The Board has been very concerned over the potential adverse effect that TISA
and part 707 will have on small credit unions that have insufficient computer
capacity to provide the statement disclosures required under § 707.6. . . . Unfortunately, Congress, when it enacted TISA, gave the Board little leeway to mitigate the statute's impact on such credit unions.
See also Department of Justice, Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry, 54
Fed Reg 34157, 34158 (1989), amending 28 CFR Part 74:
Unfortunately, however, section 108(2) of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 limits the
definition of an "eligible individual" specifically to "any individual of Japanese ancestry." Indeed, the focus throughout the Act is on those of Japanese ancestry
and the discrimination they suffered based on their race. In light of the specificity with which Congress has spoken and its focus on the racial discrimination
suffered, it must be concluded that the statute authorizes compensation be paid
only to those of Japanese ancestry, and not to those who are of non-Japanese
ancestry but who were nevertheless interned.
.. . Therefore, the Department will submit legislation to the Congress to
amend the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 to render eligible those non-Japanese family members who suffered the effects of the government's internment policy by
accompanying their spouses or children of Japanese ancestry through the evacuation and internment process.
153 See, for example, Meshal v Higgenbotham, 804 F3d 417,431 (DC Cir 2015) (Kavanaugh
concurring) ("If I were a Member of Congress, I might vote to enact a new tort cause of
action to cover a case like Meshal's. But as judges, we do not get to make that decision.");
Caterpillar,Inc v InternationalUnion, United Automobile, Aerospace and AgriculturalImplement Workers of America, 107 F3d 1052, 1066 (3d Cir 1997) (en banc) (Alito dissenting)
("If I were a legislator, I would not vote to criminalize the payments to grievance chairmen
that are at issue here. . . . Our job, however, is to interpret Section 302 as it is written.")
(paragraph break omitted).
154 See Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within Agencies, 120
Yale L J 1032, 1036-38 (2011).
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the statute unambiguously means X, while other offices (and officers) within the agency are divided as to whether X or Y is the
better policy. Under these circumstances, the path of least resistance might be for the agency to say, "We think the statute unambiguously means X," and then if the court disagrees, competing
constituencies within the agency can duke it out over whether the
agency should take position X or position Y. In other words, an
agency's failure to argue in the alternative may be part of an internal conflict-avoidance strategy.155
C.

Intra-agency Politics

A third reason why Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases continue to crop up may be that agency general counsels are using
statutory interpretation to enhance their own power and the
power of their patrons. According to former EPA general counsel
E. Donald Elliott, lawyers in the general counsel's office at an
agency can give advice on statutory meaning to other agency officials in one of two forms: (a) lawyers can give "legal advice as a
point estimate, e.g., 'the statute means this,"' or (b) lawyers can
describe the "policy space" that the statute allows-that is, the
"range of permissible interpretive discretion, within which a variety of decisions that the agency might make would be legally
defensible to varying degrees."156 Option (a) means much more
power for the general counsel, who then gets to define the
agency's position. Even if she selects option (a), the general counsel's word is not necessarily the last, but other agency actors are
much more likely to defer to the general counsel's position if she
says, "You must do X or we will lose in court," than if she says,
"You can do X or Y, and I think X is the better choice."157
To be sure, the general counsel could try to thread the needle
by telling other agency officials: "We must do X or else we will lose
in court, but it would help us win in court if we say in our preamble, 'We would do X even if we had the option to do Y."' But such

155 To be sure, the officials within the agency who favor position Y might also challenge
the general counsel's view that the statute unambiguously means X. On agency general
counsels as "keepers of what the statute means," see E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters:
How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in EnvironmentalLaw, 16 Vill Envir L J 1, 11 (2005).
156 Id at 11-12.
157 On the role of general counsels within administrative agencies, see Magill and
Vermeule, 120 Yale L J at 1059-61 (cited in note 154); Jennifer Nou, Intra-agencyCoordination, 129 Harv L Rev 421, 444-47 (2015).
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a tack would, we assume, raise eyebrows, especially if some officials in the agency most assuredly would not choose X if Y were
an option and do not see why they should have to say otherwise
in support of a policy with which they disagree. The larger point,
moreover, is that preambles are written for multiple audiencesand not just for courts. One of those other audiences comprises
agency officials beyond the general counsel's office. A general
counsel familiar with Chevron Step One-and-a-Half might decide
that the added litigation risk from failing to argue in the alternative is worth it in order to maintain control of policy-making
within the agency. In other words, agencies are "coalitions of diverse participants who have somewhat different motives" and
who sometimes work at cross-purposes.1 58
Dynamics of this sort might be particularly likely in an agency
at which the preferences of the general counsel diverge from other
actors'. At the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), for example, the president appoints the general counsel,
but some of the commissioners may have been appointed by a
prior president or be from a different political party. 5 9 After the
White House changes partisan hands, the general counsel may
be an appointee of the new president while a majority of the
Commission is composed of members of the other party. The general counsel may have an incentive to say, "The statute unambiguously means X," while knowing full well that a good chunk of the
Commission would prefer position Y. Of course, the commissioners of the opposing party may challenge the general counsel's statutory interpretation, but the general counsel may decide that her
best bet of winning the X-versus-Y fight is to say that the statute
requires outcome X.160 And note that the relevant actor need not

158 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in James Q. Wilson, ed, The Politics
of Regulation 357, 373-74 (Basic Books 1980). See also Magill and Vermeule, 120 Yale L
J at 1038 (cited in note 154) ("[T]he basic points are simple: agencies contain identifiable
constituencies that affect policymaking, and these constituencies can, and do, come into
conflict over the proper functioning of the agency.").
159 See 42 USC § 2000e-4(a), (b)(1).
160 Of course, a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half issue arises only if the EEOC passes
Chevron Step Zero. Some EEOC regulations-but not all-are considered Chevron eligible.
Compare Federal Express Corp v Holowecki, 552 US 389, 395 (2008) ("The [EEOC] has
statutory authority [under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act] to issue regulations,... and when an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then interpret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations."), with
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244,
256-58 (1991) (reasoning that there is no Chevron deference to EEOC guidelines under
Title VII).
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be the general counsel: at agencies in which other offices wield
control over the regulation-writing process, staffers in those offices may state that an interpretation is statutorily compelled as
a way to exert influence over the final product.161
D.

Intra-Executive Branch Politics

Just as agencies are a "they," not an "it," so too for the executive
branch more broadly.162 And these different parts of the executive
branch may have different missions and goals.163 In some cases,
these intra-executive branch conflicts may lay the foundation for
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases. For instance, an agency that
foresees disagreement with OIRA as to a particular policy may
have incentives to argue that the agency's preference is compelled
by Chevron Step One, and so it cannot do what OIRA would prefer. (Of course, the White House also is a "they," not an "it," so the
real world is even more complicated than this discussion lets on. 16 4
For purposes of our analysis here, however, it is sufficient to lump
the White House and OIRA together.)
For readers unfamiliar with the process of presidential review, a bit of background may be helpful.165 In recent decades, the
White House has attempted to assert greater control over the regulatory efforts of agencies.166 One of the key ways it has done so is
through a series of executive orders vesting OIRA with the responsibility for reviewing agency actions. Among the first things
that President Ronald Reagan did in office was issue Executive
Order 12291, which required agencies to submit proposed and final rules to the Office of Management and Budget (wherein OIRA

161 For the influence of career staffers over agency rules, see generally Daniel E.
Walters, Litigation-FosteredBureaucraticAutonomy: Administrative Law against Political Control, 28 J L & Polit 129 (2013).
162 See Neomi Rao, Public Choice and InternationalLaw Compliance: The Executive
Branch Is a "They,"Not an "It", 96 Minn L Rev 194, 197 (2011).
163 See, for example, Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 Tex L Rev 1137, 1138-40 (2014) (explaining how agencies and the
White House may disagree on policy).
164 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 Harv L Rev 1838, 1840, 1854, 1858 (2013).
165 For a more comprehensive overview, see generally Jennifer Nou, Agency SelfInsulation under PresidentialReview, 126 Harv L Rev 1755 (2013).
166 See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2248 (2001).
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is housed).16 The order also required agencies to prepare a regulatory impact analysis for "major rules," assessing the benefits and
costs of the contemplated action.168 Thereafter, later presidents is-

sued a number of other additional executive orders on the subjectincluding President Bill Clinton's Executive Order 12866,169 which
retained "the most important features of President Reagan's oversight system" and further formalized OIRA's regulatory review
role,170 as well as President Barack Obama's Executive Order 13563, which "reaffirm[ed]" and supplemented Clinton's order.171 While President Donald Trump has issued a number of new
executive orders addressing the regulatory process,172 he has thus
far left the OIRA review infrastructure established by his predecessors in place.173
Relevant to Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, Executive Order 13563 declares that "to the extent permitted by law, each
agency must . .. select, in choosing among alternative regulatory

approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits."174 The
italicized language is important. If an agency concludes that approach Y would maximize net benefits but the statute allows only
approach X, then Executive Order 13563 permits the agency to
proceed with approach X.175 If the agency concludes, though, that
the statute allows either X or Y, then Executive Order 13563 generally requires the agency to explain why X maximizes net benefits
or else to choose Y. Thus, if an agency prefers X, it potentially has
an incentive to say that the statute unambiguously requires X.

167 Executive Order 12291 § 3 (1981), 3 CFR 127, 128-30. Reagan later issued Executive Order 12498, which built upon the earlier order. See Executive Order 12498 (1985),
3 CFR 323.
168 See Executive Order 12291 § 3(a), (d), 3 CFR at 128-29.
169 See Executive Order 12866 (1993), 3 CFR 638.
170 Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2285 (cited in note 166).
171 Executive Order 13563 § 1(b) (2011), 3 CFR 215, 215.
172 See Executive Order 13771 § 1, 82 Fed Reg 9339, 9339 (2017) (providing that for
every new regulation issued by an executive agency, two existing regulations must be
"identified for elimination"); Executive Order 13777 §§ 2-3, 82 Fed Reg 12285, 12285-86
(2017) (directing each executive agency to designate an agency official as a "Regulatory
Reform Officer" and to convene a "Regulatory Reform Task Force").
173 See Executive Order 13777 § 2(i)-(ii), 82 Fed Reg at 12285 (cited in note 172)
(making specific reference to Clinton's Executive Order 12866 and Obama's Executive
Order 13563).
174 Executive Order 13563 § 1(b), 3 CFR at 215 (emphasis added).
175 See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 Fordham
Urban L J 1097, 1100 (2006) ("From the beginning, [ ] it has been clear that, in reviewing
the regulatory initiatives of its sister agencies, OIRA may not interfere with the agencies'
compliance with statutory directives.").
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To see how the strictures of Executive Order 13563 might
give rise to Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases, imagine the following scenario: EPA prefers approach X over approach Y but
strongly suspects that the OIRA administrator thinks that approach Y maximizes net benefits. (These sorts of disagreements
are not uncommon, especially between EPA and the White
House.)176 EPA can either (i) try to convince the OIRA administrator that the statute requires approach X or (ii) try to convince
the OIRA administrator that in fact X is the benefit-maximizing
course. EPA may decide that (i) is the more promising strategyperhaps because the OIRA administrator's views on cost-benefit
analysis are more fixed than her views on statutory interpretation.177 Accordingly, EPA may represent to OIRA that it is choosing X because the statute requires that result, even though in
reality the agency believes the statute is ambiguous.
OIRA may still disagree with EPA's statutory interpretation
and instruct the agency to adopt approach Y. If so, there may not
be a Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half scenario by the time the issue
comes to court. And in theory, EPA could tell OIRA that the statute requires X while also inserting a statement into its preamble
that the agency would choose X even if the statute were ambiguous. But we imagine that the latter course once more would be
difficult to pass by OIRA-especially if OIRA most certainly
would not approve of X if it had a choice. Again, the agency's challenge is that it has to write a preamble for multiple audiences.
What the agency needs to say to get past OIRA review may not be
the same as what it would say if it were strictly maximizing its
chances of winning in court.

176 See, for example, Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A FormerInsider's Reflections on
the Relationship between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envir L
Rev 325, 348 (2014):

OIRA, in any event, lavishes skeptical attention on EPA's estimates of regulatory costs. . . . And in my experience, OIRA personnel keep an eagle eye on
EPA-on its public announcements, website, etc.-to make sure EPA does not
sneak something past it. From OIRA's perspective, the system appears to work:
EPA receives more sustained attention from OIRA than any other federal
agency. Most often, EPA is the agency with the largest number of rules under
review at OIRA.
177 Indeed, it is worth noting that several OIRA administrators in the past have been
nonlawyers, including James C. Miller III (1981), Wendy Lee Gramm (1985-1988), John
Graham (2001-2006), and Susan Dudley (2007-2009) (though, of course, all have had the
counsel of lawyers on OIRA's staff).
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E. Interbranch Politics
Agency leaders, like anyone else,178 also presumably like to
take credit for popular policies and avoid being blamed for unpopular ones. This may be true for personal reasons (the agency head
cares about her own legacy and post-office career prospects), institutional reasons (the agency head does not want her institution
to be dragged through the mud in the media or in congressional
hearings), or partisan reasons (the agency head wants her actions
to reflect well on the president who appointed her). When an
agency head feels that, for whatever reason, a policy is the best
course even though it is unpopular, she might say, "Don't look at
us; we're just doing what Congress required." That is, an agency
may announce in a preamble to a regulation that "the statute unambiguously means X"-with no argument in the alternativebecause outcome X is widely disliked among favored constituents
or the general public, and the agency head, who nonetheless
thinks X is the right policy, wants both for X to go into effect and
to pass the buck for it.
Here, return again to the polar bear example. Prior to the DC
federal district court's November 2010 remand decision,179 the
Fish and Wildlife Service could have said that it would adopt the
same interpretation of "endangered" whether or not Congress
compelled that interpretation. As it turns out, that would have
been a useful weapon for the agency's lawyers to wield in the inevitable litigation. But the agency said no such thing, at least until it was forced to do so by the district court. Might the Service's
reluctance to take ownership of the interpretation until it was
forced to do so be explained by the fact that many in the environmental law community wanted the agency to take a more aggressive position?sO The agency, already under attack by groups who
178 See, for example, Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 Iowa L Rev 413, 477 & n 281
(1999) ("[L]egislators will try to shift blame to the IRS for the embarrassment of Congress's
own making.").
179 See generally In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule
Litigation, 748 F Supp 2d 19 (DDC 2010).
180 See Activists Slam Salazar'sESA Decision (Clean Air Report, May 14, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WLNR 9095136) ("Activists and Democrats are criticizing Interior
Secretary Ken Salazar's just-announced decision to uphold a controversial Bush administration rule on polar bear protections that limits the government's ability to use the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to regulate greenhouse gases."). Note that the polar bear listing rule was initially promulgated by the Bush administration, which may have been less
reliant on environmentalist constituencies. See Josey Ballenger, Bush's Choiceof EPA Advisers Signals Tilt toward Industry (Center for Public Integrity, Feb 12, 2001), archived at
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could be political allies, quite likely had an incentive to say, in
effect, "Don't blame us; we were just following the law," rather
than accept responsibility for a controversial policy decision.
To be sure, a buck-shifting agency could say, "Don't look at us;
Congress made us do X. And oh, by the way, if Congress hadn't
made us do X, we would have done X anyway." But for obvious reasons, we doubt that this would be an effective blame-minimization
strategy. Thus, the agency leader may face an unenviable choice:
(a) minimize blame by attributing X entirely to Congress, or
(b) minimize litigation risk while taking some ownership of the X
result. When agency heads take the former course, they run the
risk of a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand. But if X is sufficiently unpopular, or if the prospect of litigation is sufficiently unlikely or distant, then that may be a risk they are willing to take.181
F.

Interadministration Politics

Finally, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases may sometimes
arise because agency leaders are trying to bind their successors. 182
Say that an agency head prefers policy X but is worried that a
future administration may choose Y. The agency head may want
a rule's preamble to say that "the statute unambiguously means
X"-without any argument in the alternative-for two reasons.
First, the agency head may worry that arguing in the alternative
will alert future agency leaders to the possibility of choosing a policy other than X. We doubt the efficacy of this strategy, though: if
the successor is reasonably sophisticated, then the successor will
presumably notice that the statutory language is not so clear-cut.
Second, and more effectively, the agency head may realize
that the best way of preserving policy X is to secure a court decision holding that the statute unambiguously means X. As the
Supreme Court stated in National Cable & Telecommunications

http://perma.cc/3JWG-1MM6G. Our political explanation accounts for why the Obama administration stuck to the Bush administration's course-though not necessarily why the
Bush administration framed the statute as unambiguous in the first place. As to the latter
point (or, chronologically, the former point in time), see the next Section's discussion of
interadministration politics.
181 Of course, there are other possible interbranch political dynamics. For instance,
perhaps Congress-if it dislikes what the agency has done-may seize on a Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half decision to castigate the agency; losing is not popular. Needless to say,
how the branches interact is a complicated subject that merits careful examination.
182 On efforts by agencies to entrench their policy preferences before the handover to
a new administration, see generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching
Policies and Personnel before a New PresidentArrives, 78 NYU L Rev 557 (2003).
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Association v Brand X Internet Services,183 "A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion."184 That is, if a court says that the statute unambiguously
means X as a Chevron Step One matter, then the agency later in
time lacks the option of changing its policy to Y (unless, of course,
it also can convince a later-in-time court to overrule the earlier
court's decision-itself a particularly difficult task in light of the
"enhanced force" of stare decisis in statutory interpretation
cases185). Yet if the agency offers an argument in the alternative,
then a reviewing court could more easily sidestep the Chevron
Step One issue and jump straight to Chevron Step Two.186 In that
event, the agency head would not get what she is hoping for: a
precedent on the books saying that X is the agency's only option.
By maintaining that the statute unambiguously means X and
refusing to argue in the alternative, the agency forces-or at least
pushes-a court to decide the Chevron Step One question. And if
the agency thinks that it is likely to face a relatively sympathetic
court in the near term, then this strategy may be a rational one.
Even if the composition of the relevant court changes over time,
the holding by today's court that the statute unambiguously
means X carries stare decisis effect. The agency's refusal to argue
in the alternative may thus be part of a bet with a large potential
upside. If the agency faces what it perceives to be a sympathetic
court in the present period, then pressing that court toward a
Chevron Step One resolution may mean that the current agency's
views of good policy will end up being locked in, even if the
agency's personnel (and policy preferences) were to change, and
even if the court's personnel and preferences were to change. That
is a valuable asset-one almost as good as an act of Congress enshrining the current agency's preference.187

183 545 US 967 (2005).
184 Id at 982.
185 Kimble v Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S Ct 2401, 2409 (2015).
186 See, for example, Stryker v Securities and Exchange Commission, 780 F3d 163,
166 (2d Cir 2015) ("We need not, however, decide if Congress clearly intended to bar a
whistleblower award to petitioner at Chevron Step 1 because even if Dodd-Frank is ambiguous, we defer to the SEC's interpretation of Dodd-Frank at Step 2.").
187 See generally Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U Chi L Rev (forthcoming
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/BU26-BCV2.
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And note that while the potential upside is large, the downside may be minimal. If a court remands the rule to the agency on
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds, then the agency always
has the option of coming back and saying that it chooses X as a
matter of discretion. Or, at least, almost always: near the end of
an administration, there may not be time for the agency to supplement its initial preamble in the event of a Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half remand. Then again, if the administration is in its
waning days and its successor is unsympathetic to policy X, then
policy X may not be long for this world anyway. Thus, one can see
why this "bet" is potentially attractive: At worst, the agency that
adopts this strategy allows a court to strike down a rule that
would have been rescinded by the next administration in any
event. At best, the agency wins a Chevron Step One ruling that
binds subsequent administrations for the foreseeable future.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF
The previous Part listed several hypotheses as to why Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half cases might continue to arise. And we have
argued that, at least sometimes, agency actors may have an incentive to maintain that a statute is unambiguous even when
such a claim harms the agency in litigation. On this view, the fact
that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases continue to arise is
hardly nonsensical. Agencies may have good strategic reasons for
doing what they do.
Even so, an important question lingers: Does the Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half doctrine make sense? Professor Bagley, for
instance, has argued not: "the norm in Prill cases" is "needless
punishment" for agencies guilty of nothing more than a foot
fault.188 Indeed, wrote Bagley:
Rigid adherence to Prill won't make agencies better at spotting latent ambiguities. In all likelihood, agencies will carry
on much as they would in the absence of Prill, deaf to its marginal incentive effects. To the extent agencies do pay attention, their decisions will become bloated with boilerplate legal
analysis. Chenery does not demand-and should not be read
to demand-that kind of waste.1 89

188
189

Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 300 (cited in note 12).
Id at 301.
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We are sympathetic toward Bagley's position insofar as he
argues that "Chenery does not demand" that Chevron deference
be limited to cases in which the agency acknowledges ambiguity.
As we observed above, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is compatible with, but perhaps not compelled by, Chenery I. And yet we are
not convinced that the doctrine is a "waste." In particular, here
we show that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half can serve a useful
purpose-or, rather, that it can serve useful purposes, with the
purpose depending on the different reasons why agencies might
insist that ambiguous statutes are clear. Whether these benefits
outweigh the costs of additional remands and further litigation is
a harder question-one that we cannot claim to resolve here.
What we can say, though, is that the purposes served by Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half ought not be ignored in the calculus.
A.

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as a Response to Agency
Ignorance

The case for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is perhaps the
hardest to make when the issue arises due to the agency's ignorance of the doctrine. Imagine that an agency genuinely prefers
position X over position Y but says that it is adopting position X
because "the statute compels X," when in fact the statute merely
permits X but could also be read to mean Y. In this scenario, what
good does it do for the court to remand to the agency just so that
the agency can promptly turn around and jot off a supplemental
document explaining why it hews to position X as an exercise of
discretion?
Even in this most difficult scenario, however, we can think of
at least two reasons for applying the Chevron Step One-and-aHalf doctrine. First, even if the agency general counsel understands
that the statute can be read to mean X or Y-and even if the statement that "the statute compels X" was simply an ill-advised way to
explain that X is the agency's chosen policy-one might be concerned that other actors within the agency lack the same
knowledge as the general counsel. Other agency officials might
believe that the general counsel's statement-"the statute compels X"-is an indication that anything other than X would be unlawful. Indeed, it strikes us as unlikely that (a) the general counsel would lack the administrative law knowledge to understand
that the statement "the statute compels X" sets the agency up for
a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half problem, but (b) agency actors
outside the general counsel's office (including nonlawyers) would
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be so sophisticated on matters of administrative law as to understand that the statement "the statute compels X" actually means
that X and Y are both options. Put differently, our worry is that
even if the agency's Chevron Step One-and-a-Half error was entirely innocent, actors within the agency will fail to understand
that the statute actually allows option Y. Under these circumstances, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half serves to ensure that the
general counsel does not short-circuit the agency's internal policymaking process with an erroneous assertion that the statute is
clear.
Even if one is not persuaded by this first justification, however, the second is perhaps stronger: instances of agency ignorance will be difficult to distinguish from instances of agency ambivalence or strategic maneuvering. As we argue below, the
argument in favor of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is strongest
under those latter circumstances. And applying Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half in cases of agency ignorance may be necessary so
that the court does not also uphold the agency's rule in cases of
ambivalence or strategic maneuvering.
Concededly, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands in cases
of agency ignorance may lead to waste in some instances. It is
entirely possible that the X-versus-Y decision was fully vetted by
the relevant actors within the agency, and that the general counsel-failing to understand the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine-approved a preamble that characterized the choice of X as
compelled by Congress. Yet we would hope (and, indeed, expect)
that such an occurrence would be a one-off event, and that agency
lawyers would quickly learn to draft their preambles more carefully. If Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases recur (and especially
if the same agency runs afoul of the doctrine on multiple occasions), then one should begin to suspect that agencies are failing
to acknowledge ambiguity for reasons other than innocence or ignorance. If so, then-as discussed below-the case for Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half grows significantly stronger.
B.

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as a Response to Agency
Ambivalence

The second possible cause of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
cases that we mentioned above is agency ambivalence: while
agency officials believe that the statute compels X, those officials
have yet to decide whether they would prefer X or Y if freed from
statutory constraints (or, perhaps, they actually prefer Y). The
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case for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half under these conditions is
straightforward: If the agency selected policy X because it misinterpreted the relevant statute, and if the agency would not (or
might not) hew to X if liberated from its misapprehension, then why
allow the agency's choice of X to carry the force of law? Even thenJudge Roberts, a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half skeptic, acknowledged that a remand is appropriate in these circumstances:
[W]hen an agency erroneously concludes that a statutory interpretation is required by Congress, we should remand to
give the agency an opportunity to interpret the statute in the
first instance. That course is consistent with principles of
Chevron deference, and with the respect due Congress's delegation of interpretive authority to the agency. 190
Bagley has argued that cases of this sort are "rare."191 But
they are not unheard of. In 1997, the Federal Communications
Commission considered a provision of the Communications Act,192
as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,19 that temporarily forbid any "Bell operating company" from acquiring an
"alarm monitoring service entity";194 the Commission concluded
that this term was "unambiguous" and that the prohibition applied only to the takeover of an entity with "independent legal existence."195 Later that year, the DC Circuit remanded the matter
to the FCC on Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds: in the
court's view, the term "alarm monitoring service entity" was ambiguous, and the statutory prohibition might (though need not)
apply to the acquisition of an unincorporated operating division
as well.196 Given the chance at a do-over, the FCC turned on a

190 PDK LaboratoriesInc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F3d
786, 808 (DC Cir 2004) (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
191 Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 300 n 326 (cited in note 12).
192 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified as amended in various sections of Title 47.
193 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified as amended in various sections of Title 47.
194 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 275(a), 110 Stat at 105, codified at 47 USC § 275(a).
195 In the Matter of Enforcement of Section 275(a)(2) of the Communications Act of
1934, as Amended by the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, againstAmeritech Corp, 12 FCC
Rec 3855, 3859 (1997).
196 Alarm Industry CommunicationsCommittee v FederalCommunications Commission,
131 F3d 1066, 1068-72 (DC Cir 1997).
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dime and said that an unincorporated operating division was indeed an "alarm monitoring service entity" for purposes of the
provision.197
Somewhat surprisingly, the same pattern repeats itself with
respect to two other FCC determinations from the same year:
1997. In one case, the FCC determined that § 254(g) of the Telecommunications Act-which requires certain providers of telecommunications services to offer uniform rates to customers
across states919-applied to providers of commercial mobile radio
services.199 The DC Circuit later vacated the FCC's order because
the agency erroneously believed that § 254(g) unambiguously applied to commercial mobile radio services providers.200 The FCC
then reversed itself: "Exercising our authority to interpret this
ambiguous provision," the Commission said, "we find that the approach more faithful to the spirit of the statutory rate integration
requirement is that .

.

. the requirement does not apply to [com-

mercial mobile radio services] providers."201 Also in 1997, the FCC
determined that it was barred by Congress from collecting a regulatory fee from the congressionally chartered satellite communications provider Comsat.202 Another operator of telecommunications
satellites, PanAmStat, challenged Comsat's exemption; the DC
Circuit determined that "the FCC was mistaken in its conclusion
that the statute compelled an exemption for Comsat";203 and on
remand, the FCC, exercising its newfound discretion, decided to
charge Comsat $1.6 million in fees.204

Moreover, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands can serve
important purposes even when they do not spur the agency to reverse course 180 degrees. For example, a remand might (and

197 See In the Matter of Enforcement of Section 275(a)(2) of the Communications Act
of 1934, as Amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, againstAmeritech Corp, 13
FCC Rec 19046, 19052 (1998).
198 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 254(g), 110 Stat at 73, codified as amended at
47 USC § 254(g).
199 See GTE Service Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 224 F3d 768, 77071 (DC Cir 2000).
200 Id at 775-76.
201 In the Matter of South Seas Broadcasting,Inc, 26 FCC Rec 4164, 4167 (2011).
202 PanAmSat Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 198 F3d 890, 892-94
(DC Cir 1999).
203 Id at 896.
204 Comsat Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 283 F3d 344, 346-47 (DC
Cir 2002).
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sometimes does2os) lead an agency to make substantive alterations
to a prior rule without changing direction entirely. And even if an
agency reaches the same result on remand, while doing so it may
also gain additional knowledge that will have spillover effects on
other policies. For instance, imagine an agency that is ambivalent
about its preferred policy when it first announces its view that the
statute is unambiguous (for example, it tentatively thinks that if
it had discretion, it would choose X, but it is not sure). Forcing the
agency to drill down and really decide for sure that it wants X
rather than Y increases the agency's knowledge of what it is regulating, and so also its expertise. And the fact that the agency has
been given this discretion suggests, under the implied delegation
theory of Chevron, that Congress wants the agency to undertake
that learning process rather than simply free ride on the statute. 206 To a reviewing court (or a skeptical professor), it may look
like nothing has changed-the agency ended up in the same place
it began. Only now the agency knows for certain what it thinks
because it has done its homework.207
Even so, we obviously agree with Bagley that, in most cases,
an agency that says in the first instance that "the statute compels
X" will, following a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand, adopt
position X as an exercise of discretion. Yet we doubt that courts
can separate out these cases from ones in which a remand will
indeed cause the agency to change course, either with regard to
205 See, for example, Coalition for Common Sense in Government Procurement v
United States, 671 F Supp 2d 48, 56 (DDC 2009); Coalition for Common Sense in Government Procurement v United States, 821 F Supp 2d 275, 279 n 4 (DDC 2011).
206 See, for example, PDK Laboratories, 362 F3d at 797-98 (explaining that Chevron
Step Two requires that the agency "must bring its experience and expertise to bear in light
of competing interests at stake").
207 Given "logrolling" within an agency (that is, trading votes across issues), Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half may affect outcomes on the ground in other ways. See Jim Rossi,
Book Review, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the ContemporaryAdministrativeState, 96 Mich L Rev 1746, 1753 & n 32 (1998); Glen Staszewski, Textualism and
the Executive Branch, 2009 Mich St L Rev 143, 170. An agency general counsel's assertion
that a statute is unambiguous may take the relevant issue off the table for purposes of
intra-agency bargaining, whereas if the issue were the subject of bargaining, the agency's
position not on that particular issue but on other issues might change. Imagine that on
Issue 1, the agency chooses between options X and Y, while on Issue 2, the agency chooses
between options P and Q. If the agency general counsel says that the statute compels X,
then the forces in favor of P may prevail in the P-versus-Q debate. If, however, a court
remands on the ground that the statute allows for X or Y, relevant actors within the agency
who favor X over Y may agree to support option Q over P in return for others within the
agency coming around to the X position. The court's Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand
on the X-versus-Y question may have no effect on that particular issue, but may sway the

outcome from P to

Q.
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the same rule or with regard to another rule altogether. Reliance
on the agency's representations in litigation is itself an unreliable
approach: the positions adopted by attorneys who represent the
agency in court-oftentimes Justice Department lawyers rather
than agency employees-may not reflect the views of all the
agency actors who might have the opportunity to weigh in on remand.208 In any event, even if agency leaders do sign off on the
litigators' strategy, the agency's learning process would still be
short-circuited, because the process of signing off on a lawyer's
call is not the same as deliberately considering a policy through a
more structured rulemaking process.
C.

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as a Response to Strategic
Behavior

In Part III, we suggested that an agency's failure to argue in
the alternative that it would arrive at the same position as an
exercise of discretion does not necessarily reflect ignorance or ambivalence. We proffered four potential strategic explanations-rooted in intra-agency, intra-executive branch, interbranch, and
interadministration politics-that might account for the observed
phenomenon. Here, we argue that if indeed Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half cases arise because of any of these first three strategic
reasons, then the justification for the doctrine is especially sound.
(We address the possibility of interadministration strategic behavior in Part IV.D.)
Start with the first of these strategic explanations: an
agency's general counsel may maintain that the statute compels
X so as to exert greater control over the intra-agency decisionmaking process. For adherents to the implied delegation theory
of Chevron, this is an obvious problem. Congress generally delegates authority to agency leaders or to the agency as a whole,209
not to the agency general counsel. We struggle to see any reason
why it is normatively desirable-or acceptable-for lawyers
within an agency to use their privileged positions to impose policy
preferences to which other agency actors might object. Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half helps deter this sort of behavior, although
in an admittedly messy way: it imposes a cost on the agency as a
whole (the cost of responding to a remand) when actors within the
See Sunstein, 126 Harv L Rev at 1855 (cited in note 164).
See David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron's NondelegationDoctrine, 2001 S
Ct Rev 201, 238.
208
209
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agency attempt to paper over the possibility that the statute allows for other options.
The notion of agency lawyers asserting that a statute is unambiguous in order to squeeze other actors out of the decisionmaking process is equally problematic-if not more so-under the
expertise account of Chevron. The Supreme Court has said that
"practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications
behind Chevron deference";210 such practical (and often technical)
expertise is likely to be found in parts of the agency beyond the
general counsel's office. Courts have reason to doubt that such
expertise will be brought to bear on a policy question when the
general counsel comes out of the gate saying that a particular result is legally required.
Next, consider the possibility that Chevron Step One-and-aHalf cases arise as a by-product of agencies attempting to avoid
reversal by OIRA. Critics of OIRA's role in the regulatory process
21
might be willing to countenance this outcome. 1 Adherents to the
accountability theory of Chevron, however, will find it perturbing.
The accountability theory of Chevron is based on the twin premises that agencies are accountable to the chief executive and that
the chief executive is accountable to voters. OIRA review of
agency action justifies the first of these twin premises.212 Agency
circumvention of OIRA review undermines that same premise.
The more we take the accountability discussion in Chevron seriously, the stronger the argument for Chevron Step One-and-aHalf becomes.
In a similar vein, adherents to the accountability theory of
Chevron might be concerned about agency preambles attributing
to Congress policy decisions that agency officials have made
themselves. If the theory undergirding Chevron is that voters
should be the judges of the executive branch's policy choices, then
presumably the executive branch should have to take ownership
of those policy choices so that voters know whom to blame (and to
credit). To be sure, we doubt whether citizens are consulting the
Federal Register along with the League of Women Voters' Guide
before they head to the polls.213 And yet accountability theories
210 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v The LTV Corp, 496 US 633, 651-52 (1990).
211 See generally, for example, Heinzerling, 33 Fordham Urban L J 1097 (cited in
note 175).
212 See Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2376 (cited in note 166).
213 For a broader critique of accountability arguments in administrative law, see generally Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, DiscountingAccountability (unpublished manuscript,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/M7GF-URYZ.
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need not rely on electoral accountability as the exclusive transmission belt. We might take a more pluralistic approach and imagine
interest groups, media organizations, and other sophisticated actors attributing credit and blame across branches based in part
on agencies' characterizations of their own degrees of freedom.214
If this is the case, then an agency's assertion that the relevant
statute is unambiguous may serve an accountability-deflecting
function. Granted, this argument depends on those who evaluate
agencies (1) being sophisticated enough to distinguish, based on
a preamble or similar document, whether the agency believes its
action to be compelled by Congress, but (2) not being so sophisticated as to arrive at their own conclusion as to whether the
agency's action is congressionally compelled. These two conditions may strike some readers as implausible. Yet when the
stakes are high and many people are watching, an agency may be
happy for any blame it can avoid, even if it cannot avoid all of it.
For all these reasons, we might be concerned about an agency
(or the rule-writing lawyers within an agency) characterizing a
statute as unambiguous when a fairer reading is that the statute
affords the agency substantial discretion. And yet there is one
more step in the logic before these concerns lead to a justification
for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. Arguably, a court could mitigate at least some of these concerns with a thorough opinion explaining that the relevant statute is ambiguous and yet upholding the agency's interpretation as permissible. Assuming that
the relevant individuals-nonlawyers within the agency, staffers at OIRA, and the external actors assigning credit or blame
to Congress or the executive branch-read the opinion as well as
the preamble (or read synopses of each), then the court could at
least alert these individuals that X is not compelled and that Y remains an option. And an opinion would do so without the disruption of a remand, thus partially addressing Bagley's and Roberts's
concerns about "waste[ful]" rounds of "ping-pong."215
There are, however, two reasons to doubt the corrective
power of an opinion that identifies a statutory ambiguity but does
not remand to the agency. First, the agency's initial selection of X
over Y sets the status quo to X, and the status quo may be a sticky
one. Actors within the agency who would prefer Y may be in a
214 See, for example, Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 Minn L
Rev 1253, 1271-77 (2009) (explaining "Partial, Proxy, and Direct Political Accountability"
theories).
215 See text accompanying notes 19 and 189.
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weaker position to advocate for their preference once X is in place
than when the X-versus-Y decision is incipient. This is not unlike
what happens within Congress; because (by design) it is so hard
to run the lawmaking gauntlet, there is a heavy status quo bias.216
So too with agencies; in a world of "ossification" of significant
rules,217 it can be difficult to do all the work that is required to
unwind an administrative decision. It thus is quite unlikely, for
instance, that language in a judicial opinion-language not
backed up by a judgment-will restart the OIRA review process
and force the agency to justify X over Y on the basis of cost-benefit
analysis and presidential priorities. In short, an after-the-fact judicial opinion announcing that the relevant statute is ambiguous
will not entirely negate the ability of agency officials (and, in particular, agency lawyers) to impose their preferences in ways not
contemplated by Chevron.
Second, many agency actions do not result in litigation, and
in all but the most exceptional cases, the probability of litigation
is less than unity. (And even if the probability of litigation is one,
there is no guarantee that the plaintiffs will raise and properly
preserve a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half argument.) If an agency
can assert that a statute is unambiguous and face only the consequence of a judicial slap on the wrist, then the incentive for agencies (and agency lawyers) to take this tack will be stronger. If
agency leaders (or agency lawyers) prefer X and know that there
is no real sting from telling intra-agency constituencies, OIRA,
and the public that X is the only option allowed by the statute,
then-well-why not? Critical language in a judicial opinion may
be embarrassing to the agency, but, at the same time, the odds of
that language being written are long; there must be litigation (no
foregone conclusion), and the court must resolve the case against
the agency on Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds (as opposed
to on any other outcome-determinative issue). If judicial review
amounts to nothing more than a chance-not even a certainty-of

216 See Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
156 U Pa L Rev 923, 936-37 (2008) ("The future legislature can always repeal or alter the
program, but once regulations have been implemented, some form of status quo bias may
make it marginally harder to eliminate them-especially during periods of divided government."). Consider also John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 Green Bag 2d 191
(2007) ("The cumbersomeness of the process seems obviously suited to interests that contradict the 'more is better' attitude that has come to be almost an unconscious assumption
of public law.").
217 See generally Richard J. Pierce Jr, Rulemaking OssificationIs Real:A Response to
Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 1493 (2012).
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harsh words, it is easy to imagine the cost-benefit analysis cutting
against acknowledging statutory ambiguity. Hence one of the key
benefits of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half: remands under Step
One-and-a-Half impose a cost on agencies that is borne in part by
the agency leaders and lawyers likely to make the decision
whether to acknowledge ambiguity in the preamble.
So what Roberts referred to as "ping-pong" and Bagley considered a "waste" might instead be a necessary element of an optimal deterrence approach: yes, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands impose costs on agencies, but those are costs meant to
discourage agencies from ascribing policy choices to Congress that
Congress has delegated to the agencies. This point is especially
forceful when one remembers that agencies and courts are repeat
players. Given this dynamic, a remand in one case may very well
have beneficial systemic effects for a host of other cases. 218
This raises the question: How costly should Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half remands be? When an agency says in the preamble to a rule that the statute compels X rather than Y and the
court concludes that X and Y are both permissible interpretations
of the statute, then the court could:
(1) Do nothing so long as the agency represents in litigation
that it in fact prefers X (the Roberts/Bagley approach);
(2) Remand to the agency but leave the rule in place for the
time being;

218 So far, we have been operating under the assumption that other actors within the
agency are unaware of the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine. Relaxing this assumption leads to a further argument in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half s favor. This is because
even if other actors within the agency are sufficiently sophisticated to understand the contours of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, it may still be the case that the agency general
counsel, by virtue of the legal expertise at her disposal, remains the agency actor best able
to predict how a court will interpret a statute. For this reason, other agency actors may
value the, general counsel's opinion as to whether a statute unambiguously means X. But
in the absence of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, the general counsel's assertion that "the
statute unambiguously means X" is cheap talk: other actors within the agency have little
reason to credit the general counsel's assertion, given that the assertion is costless from
the general counsel's perspective. With Chevron Step One-and-a-Half in the background,
other agency actors may be more likely to believe the general counsel's assertion that "the
statute unambiguously means X," because if the reviewing court concludes otherwise, a
remand will impose costs on the agency general counsel (for example, the costs of further
rulemaking proceedings and potential litigation). Thus, by attaching a cost to the general
counsel's assertion regarding a statute's unambiguous meaning, the Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half doctrine potentially allows for more efficient intra-agency information sharing.
That is, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half may allow the general counsel to communicate her
interpretation of the statute's meaning to other agency actors-and to do so credibly.
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(3) Remand to the agency and vacate the rule; or
(4) Impose Y as a penalty for the agency's failure to
acknowledge ambiguity.
We explore in Part V.B the advantages and disadvantages
of each of these options. But before addressing the question of
remedy in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases, we take up the
last of the strategic reasons why agencies might put themselves
in a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half box: the "interadministration
politics" possibility.
D.

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as an Invitation for Strategic
Agency Behavior

We noted above that agencies might insist that a statute unambiguously means X so as to secure a holding that the statute
indeed means X (and only X). If the agency can get a reviewing
court to say that the statute means X, that locks X in place against
modification by future agencies.219 Of course, this gambit might,
in some cases, result in a remand should the court conclude that
the statute could mean X or Y. And yet, in one sense, Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half actually aids the agency's strategy in these
sorts of cases, because the doctrine prevents the reviewing court
from skipping to Chevron Step Two.
To elaborate: Imagine that a statute might mean X or Y, the
agency prefers X over Y, and the agency fears that a future administration might prefer Y over X. The agency also thinks that
the relevant reviewing court is generally minimalist, and so will
rule (in the agency's favor) on Chevron Step Two grounds if given
the option. Finally, the agency thinks that the reviewing court, as
currently composed, is likely to rule in favor of the agency at
Chevron Step One today if forced to confront the Step One issuebut that if a future administration switches to position Y, the reviewing court later in time might not strike down the future
agency's action on Chevron Step One grounds. (This could be because the agency believes that the composition of the court might
change, or because the agency believes that, all else equal, the
court is more likely to go along with the agency's position than go
against it.)

219 See Gersen and O'Connell, 156 U Pa L Rev at 936 (cited in note 216) (noting tension between present and future versions of the agency).
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Under these circumstances, the agency might want to force
a Chevron Step One decision today. But in the absence of the
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine, the agency would have
trouble doing so. Even if the agency insists that the statute unambiguously means X, a court in a world without Step One-anda-Half would have the option of skipping straight to Chevron Step
Two. And that, of course, would thwart the agency's entrenchment strategy.
Should the possibility that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
might facilitate this sort of strategic behavior curb our enthusiasm for the doctrine? Perhaps-but probably not by much. While
we believe that some amount of strategic behavior by agencies
might explain some number of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
cases, the amount of plotting involved in this last scenario strikes
us as House of Cards-esque. This is not to rule out the possibility
that Frank Underwood types might be found in some agency general counsel's offices (and, indeed, we suspect that agency lawyers
are engaged in strategic maneuvering to some extent, especially
for high-profile decisions220). But although it is imperfect, we
think the better response to this last gambit would be for the reviewing court to reject the agency's attempt to force a Chevron
Step One ruling unless the court believes that the statute is in
fact unambiguous-in which case a ruling to that effect strikes us
as entirely appropriate.
E.

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as an Invitation for Strategic
Judicial Behavior

Our analysis would not be complete without mentioning one
last concern: the possibility that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
might add to the power of courts, potentially in undesirable ways.
So far, our analysis has discussed the strategic reasons (among
others) why an agency may say that a statute is unambiguous
while a court later concludes that the same statute is ambiguous.
But might not Chevron Step One-and-a-Half open up new strategic opportunities for the court as well? Imagine that the agency
prefers to read a statute to mean X, while a court prefers for the
same statute to mean Y. If the agency says that the statute unambiguously means X, then without Chevron Step One-and-aHalf, the court would have two statutory interpretation options:
220 See Nielson, 105 Georgetown L J at 979-82 (cited in note 87) (listing examples of
strategic behavior).
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(1) uphold the agency's interpretation or (2) say that the agency's
interpretation is not a "permissible" reading.221 The second option
may be costly for the court, perhaps because the claim that X is
an impermissible reading of the statute is difficult to make with
a straight face (and thus the assertion damages the court's reputation and perceived legitimacy). Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
gives the court a third option: say that the statute is ambiguous,
and thus that the matter must be remanded to the agency. This
third option may be a low-cost course from the court's perspective,
because what constitutes ambiguity can itself be ambiguous;222
the reputational consequences for the court are thus less severe
than the ramifications of option (2). In this way, Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half gives a court with ideological preferences at odds
with an agency's an easy way to throw sand in the agency's gears.
We are mindful of this concern and understand why those
who are skeptical of judicial review may believe that this risk cuts
against enforcement of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. That said,
we are not especially moved. If an agency, for instance, is worried
about this sort of strategic judicial behavior, it can always argue
in the alternative (that is, both assert that the statute is unambiguous and also explain why it would reach the same result even
if the statute were ambiguous). In other words, although this concern about judges should not be understated, it also should not be
overstated; agencies have a "self-help" mechanism, even though
they do not always opt to use it. Moreover, this third option
availed to courts by Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is a strategy of
questionable efficacy: if the agency prefers reading X to reading Y, it still can adopt reading X as an exercise of interpretive
discretion on remand. Perhaps a court in the last few months of
an administration may view the third option as a way to run out
the clock, in the hope that a different administration-with ideological preferences closer to the court's-will take the reins before the remand proceedings are complete. We should note,
though, that none of the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases
from the DC Circuit identified in our Online Appendix plausibly
fit this pattern. 223
Chevron, 467 US at 842-43.
See, for example, Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2118 (cited in note 8).
223 One such case, Jacoby v National Labor Relations Board, 233 F3d 611 (DC Cir
2000), was handed down less than six weeks before the end of the Clinton administration
and the beginning of the presidency of George W. Bush. We doubt, though, that Jacoby is
an example of strategic behavior by a court that was ideologically adverse to the agency
and stalling for time. First, the relevant agency-the National Labor Relations Board-is
221
222
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V. IMPLEMENTING CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF

Thus far, we have argued that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half
is a distinct doctrine-consistent with, but not dictated by, the
justifications proffered in (and for) Chevron itself. We have also

argued that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases may continue to
arise even if agency lawyers are aware of the doctrine: there are

reasons rooted in ambivalence as well as strategy why agency actors may insist that a statute is unambiguous even though such
insistence works to the agency's disadvantage in litigation. Finally, we have argued that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is an
appropriate response to agency protestations of statutory clarity-though with the consequence that in some cases the doctrine may give agencies the option of forcing a judicial decision
at Chevron Step One.
Here we address three ancillary questions. First, in what cir-

cumstances should Chevron Step One-and-a-Half be triggered?
Second, what sort of remedy is appropriate in Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half cases? And third, even if Chevron Step One-and-aHalf is sensible prudentially, can it be justified jurisprudentially?
Our views on the first two questions remain tentative-and the
DC Circuit itself has yet to arrive at firm answers to either. As to
the third question, we acknowledge that Chevron Step One-anda-Half is-for better or worse-"administrative common law,"
without a firm anchor in the text of the Administrative Procedure Act224 (APA). And yet so too (and no less) is Chevron itself.
So long as we have a Chevron doctrine, we think that Chevron

an independent agency whose members serve five-year terms, and Clinton-appointed
Democratic members continued to constitute a majority of the Board for months after
Bush's inauguration. (Indeed, the Board did not become majority Republican until January 2002.) See John D. Schulz, Changing Faces (JOC, Oct 20, 2002), online at
http://www.joc.com/trucking-logistics/changing-faces_20021020.html (visited Apr 9, 2017)
(Perma archive unavailable); Board Members since 1935 (National Labor Relations
Board), archived at http://perma.cc/55Y9-CE94.This was thus not a case in which delaying
a resolution for a few months until a new administration took power was likely to change
the result. Second, Jacoby is a case that does not map easily onto ideological lines: unlike
an employee-versus-employer case (in which one might expect the Board's more liberal members to be more sympathetic toward the employee), and unlike a union-versus-employer case
(in which one might expect the Board's more liberal members to be more sympathetic toward the union), Jacoby was an employee-versus-union case. The NLRB's decision had the
support of one of its two Republican members at the time, see generally Plumbers Local 342
(Contra Costa Electric), 329 NLRB 688 (1999), and the DC Circuit's unanimous opinion
was issued by an ideologically diverse panel including two Reagan appointees (Judge
Stephen Williams and Judge David Sentelle) as well as one Clinton appointee (Judge
Judith Rogers). Jacoby, 233 F3d at 613.
224 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended at 5 USC § 551 et seq.
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Step One-and-a-Half plays an important role in preventing the
Chevron framework from being flipped on its head.
A.

Ambiguity about Ambiguity

The easiest Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases are the ones
in which an agency says that "the statute unambiguously means
X or says that "the statute is ambiguous-it allows both X and
Y-and we choose X as a matter of discretion." Such cases are not
uncommon. 225 Nor, however, are such cases universal: oftentimes
an agency's preamble or decision will lie somewhere between
these two extremes. 226
One possible response is for the court to apply a "magic
words" approach: unless the agency explicitly says that the statute is ambiguous, or explicitly says that it would reach the same
result if the statute were ambiguous, then the court will not afford
deference to the agency at Chevron Step Two. At the other extreme, the court could apply a "benefit of the doubt" approach:
225 See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency, Air Quality Plans; Florida;
Infrastructure Requirements for the 2012 PM2.5 National Ambient Air Quality Standard,
81 Fed Reg 50416, 50418 (2016), amending 40 CFR Part 52:
EPA therefore believes that while the timing requirement in section 110(a)(1) is
unambiguous, some of the other statutory provisions are ambiguous. In particular,
EPA believes that the list of required elements for infrastructure SIP submissions
provided in section 110(a)(2) contains ambiguities concerning what is required for
inclusion in an infrastructure SIP submission.
See also Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed Reg 49360, 49386 n 351 (2016), amending various sections of CFR
Title 17:
We acknowledge that the statutory interpretation arguments we identify do not
demonstrate an unambiguous Congressional intent to require public disclosure.
... We believe that, at a minimum, Congress provided the Commission with discretionary authority. As such, based on our assessment of the record evidence
and our weighing of the various policy considerations, we have determined to
exercise that discretion by requiring public disclosure of each issuer's annual
report on Form SD.
See also Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Procedures for Conducting Hearings on
Conformance with the Acceptance Criteria in Combined Licenses, 81 Fed Reg 43266,
43278 (2016) ("[T]he statutory language is not clear and unambiguous.").
226 In the polar bear case, for example, counsel for the Fish and Wildlife Service "conceded at oral argument that the agency does not seek deference to its interpretation of the
definition of an endangered species under step two of the Chevron test and instead relies
exclusively on a plain-meaning interpretation of the ESA." In re PolarBear Endangered
Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 748 F Supp 2d 19, 29 (DDC 2010). The
district court noted, though, that absent this concession it would have been difficult to
determine whether the Service considered the statute to be clear or whether it considered
the statute to be ambiguous and had adopted its interpretation as an exercise of discretion.
See id at 29 n 16.
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unless the agency explicitly says that the statute is unambiguous,
then the court will assume that the agency is exercising its discretion. A third possibility is a "mind reading" tack: if the agency
is ambiguous as to whether it thinks the statute is ambiguous,
then the court will do its best to divine the agency's view. A fourth
route is an "ask the attorney" approach: when in doubt, the court
can ask the agency's lawyer at oral argument whether the agency
would hew to its position if the statute were ambiguous.
We think there is much to be said for the "magic words" approach, which would encourage the authors of agency preambles
to make clear to other agency officials, OIRA, and the public when
the agency is exercising policy discretion. We think there is much
less to be said for the "ask the attorney" approach, which would
do little to deter the sort of strategic behavior discussed above.
Agencies (and agency lawyers) would then be able to say in their
preambles that a particular policy is compelled by Congress, and
only in the event of litigation (and, even then, only in the event
that a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half argument arises) would the
agency have to take ownership of its choice.
Ultimately, the choice among triggering rules comes down to
how we want to allocate interpretive and explanatory burdens.
The "magic words" approach imposes a burden on preamble writers to say at the outset that the agency is exercising its discretion.
The "benefit of the doubt" approach imposes a burden on other
actors-within the agency, elsewhere within the executive
branch, and outside the government-to understand that anything other than an unambiguous statement of unambiguity
amounts to an exercise of discretion. The "mind reading" tack
places the burden on the court to divine the agency's intent-but
also on the other actors within and outside the agency to determine whether the agency is or is not exercising interpretive discretion. The "ask the attorney" approach places an even heavier
burden on the other actors within and outside the agency, who
now must divine the agency's intent not on the basis of the past
statements, but on the basis of future ones.
In some cases, the DC Circuit appears to follow something
like the "benefit of the doubt" approach. For instance, in Braintree
Electric Light Department v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,227 the court rejected a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half attack
by stating that so "long as the text is ambiguous and the agency

227

667 F3d 1284 (DC Cir 2012).
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does not insist that it is clear, a reasonable interpretation will
warrant our deference."22s This raises the obvious concern that the
preamble to an agency rule may suggest to nonlawyers within and
outside the agency that the statutory language is clear, while still
leaving the agency wiggle room in the event of a Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half challenge. In other cases, the DC Circuit appears
to impose a higher bar: for example, the court in Peter Pan said
that "Chevron step 2 deference is reserved for those instances
when an agency recognizes that the Congress's intent is not plain
from the statute's

face."229

Our modest suggestion is that the DC

Circuit should clarify the ambiguity as to how it will treat ambiguity about ambiguity. If the "benefit of the doubt" approach is
the governing regime, then relevant actors within and outside the
agency should know that any time the agency does not say that
the statute is clear, the agency is eligible for Chevron Step Two
deference. Such a bright-line rule-clearly stated by the courtswould go some way toward reducing opportunities for agency actors to suggest one thing in the rulemaking process and another
in litigation.
B.

Choosing a Remedy

A second question in the implementation of Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half is the choice of remedy: If an agency runs afoul of
the Step One-and-a-Half doctrine, should a reviewing court (1) let
it go, (2) remand without vacatur, (3) remand with vacatur, or
(4) impose the opposite of the agency's preferred rule? For all the
reasons explained above, we think option (1) is a bad one. Choosing between options (2) and (3), however, is more complicated.
Administrative remedies have been largely overlooked in the
scholarly literature-to the detriment of the field.230 In short,

§ 706 of the APA says that "[t]he reviewing court shall ...

hold
capri"arbitrary,
is
that
action"
unlawful and set aside agency
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

228 Id at 1288-89 (emphasis added). See also Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration v National Cement Co of California,494 F3d 1066, 1074 (DC Cir 2007) (focusing
on an agency assertion that "the definition of 'coal or other mine' plainly includes a road
such as the one at issue"); Arizona v Thompson, 281 F3d 248, 253 (DC Cir 2002) (focusing
on an agency assertion that "the TANF legislation does not permit it being designated as
the primary program") (ellipses and emphasis omitted).
229 PeterPan, 471 F3d at 1354 (emphasis added).
230 See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 255 (cited in note 12) (noting "systematic inattention to remedial questions" in administrative law).
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law."231 Despite this language, the DC Circuit has concluded-al-

beit not without controversy232-that not all unlawful agency actions must be vacated. Instead, sometimes a court will remand
without vacating under what has come to be known as the AlliedSignal doctrine, so named for the 1993 case (Allied-Signal, Inc v
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission233) in which it was
articulated.
Under the Allied-Signal doctrine, "[t]he decision whether to
vacate depends on 'the seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and
thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and
the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself
be changed."'234 The facts of Allied-Signal illustrate how the doctrine works. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission promulgated a rule to recoup some of the costs incurred when the agency
provides services to regulated parties. Allied-Signal challenged
that regulation as arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the
statute because the agency did not adequately consider the ability
of certain types of companies to "pass through" charges to consumers. 235 The Commission had exempted certain nonprofit institutions from the rule because they could not readily pass through
charges to consumers, but had not considered whether other entities were similarly restricted-which rendered the rule a violation of the "reasoned decision-making" requirement.236 The DC
Circuit concluded, however, that vacatur was not required. After
all, it was possible that the Commission could "explain how the
principles supporting an exemption for educational institutions
do not justify a similar exemption" for other types of entities.237
And "[a]t the same time, the consequences of vacating may be
quite disruptive," especially because "the Commission would
need to refund all .

.

. fees collected from those [entities]; in ad-

dition it evidently would be unable to recover those fees under a
231 5 USC § 706.
232 See, for example, Comcast Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 579 F3d
1, 10 (DC Cir 2009) (Randolph concurring) ("I continue to believe that whenever a reviewing court finds an administrative rule or order unlawful, the Administrative Procedure
Act requires the court to vacate the agency's action."). See also generally Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations:Remands without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36
Ariz St L J 599 (2004).
233 988 F2d 146 (DC Cir 1993).
234 Id at 150-51, quoting International Union, United Mine Workers of America v
Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, 920 F2d 960, 967 (DC Cir 1990).
235 Allied-Signal, 988 F2d at 148-49.
236 Id at 150.
237 Id at 151.
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later-enacted rule."238 The Allied-Signal doctrine has also been
adopted beyond the DC Circuit.239 The Supreme Court, however,
has not addressed its legality.240
The Allied-Signal doctrine could be combined with Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half. For instance, in Coalition for Common
Sense in Government Procurement v United States,241 the court
confronted a Department of Defense regulation involving "Federal Ceiling Prices" (that is, the highest amount federal agencies
can pay contractors) that the agency claimed was mandated by
Congress.242 The court disagreed with the agency that the agency
did not have discretion and, under Prill, concluded that the court
could not determine whether the agency's regulation could nonetheless be upheld.243 Rather than vacate the regulation, however,
the court applied Allied-Signal to conclude that the regulation
should be remanded only.24 Likewise, in the polar bear illustration presented above, the court concluded that the agency wrongly
disclaimed discretion, but rather than vacate the agency's rule,
the court simply remanded for additional proceedings.245
There is much to be said for this sort of approach-making
an agency start the regulatory process anew imposes massive
costs, and perhaps the disciplining effects of Chevron Step

238 Id. See also Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: JudicialRemedies and Equitable
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 Duke L J 291, 374-75 (2003). See also generally
Kristina Daugirdas, Note, EvaluatingRemand without Vacatur: A New JudicialRemedy
for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 NYU L Rev 278 (2005).
239 See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 307 (cited in note 12) ("Other circuits-including the
First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal-have followed the D.C. Circuit's lead.").
See also, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council v United States Environmental
ProtectionAgency, 808 F3d 556, 584 (2d Cir 2015) (finding an agency action to be arbitrary
and capricious and remanding without vacating); California Communities against Toxics
v United States Environmental Protection Agency, 688 F3d 989, 992 (9th Cir 2012) (per
curiam) ("A flawed rule need not be vacated.").
240
241

See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 308 (cited in note 12).

242

Id at 53-54.

671 F Supp 2d 48 (DDC 2009).

See id at 55-56 (explaining that "[h]aving concluded that the statutory language
does not speak to precisely how the Department should implement the statute, the Court
ordinarily would move to Chevron step two," but stating that it accepted the plaintiffs
argument that it could not "do so here because the rule's preamble reveals that the agency
mistakenly believed that Congress mandated the requirement of a manufacturer refund").
243

244

245

See id at 59.
See In re PolarBear, 748 F Supp 2d at 30:

[The Court hereby remands the Listing Rule to the agency for the limited purpose
of providing additional explanation for the legal basis of its listing determination,
and for such further action as it may wish to take in light of the Court's finding
that the definition of an "endangered species" under the ESA is ambiguous.
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One-and-a-Half can be achieved without the need for such costs,
at least sometimes. Thus, a reviewing court, as a matter of its
equitable judgment, could determine whether the case-specific
costs or the broader institutional values should win out. The problem, however, is that courts may not be well positioned to strike
that balance, especially because much of what happens during the
rulemaking process occurs in a "black box."246 Hence, it may be
difficult to know just how innocent a mistake is.
Moreover, the costs imposed by vacatur are arguably part of
the deterrence effect of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. Indeed,
courts could go a step further and establish a rule of the following
sort: if a statute could mean X or Y and the agency insists that
the statute unambiguously means X, then the penalty for the
agency's failure to acknowledge ambiguity is that the court will
impose Y. We anticipate that under such a regime, agencies
would much more readily acknowledge their own discretion. Indeed, the total costs of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands
may decline as such remands become rarer and rarer. 247 Yet this
"super penalty" approach makes much more sense on a whiteboard than in the real world. If an agency promulgates an
eighty-page rule on a complicated subject based on its view that
a statute means X, would a court be competent to write its own
version of the rule on the view that the statute means Y? We are
doubtful.248
At bottom, we think the remedy question defies easy answer.
Our intuition is that, given the high costs of vacatur, a contextdependent approach makes the most sense here-with vacatur
reserved for cases that cannot be chalked up to innocent agency
error. And yet we acknowledge that the high costs of vacatur
might also counsel in favor of invoking that remedy more readily
so as to achieve optimal deterrence.

246 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and
Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L Rev 486, 488, 514-15 (2002).
247 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An
Economic Approach, 76
J Polit Econ 169 (1968) (theorizing a model for the optimal choice of punishment in order
to deter wrongdoing while minimizing social loss).
248 Consider too that the higher the cost to the court of a Chevron
Step One-and-aHalf remand, the more reluctant the court will be to invoke the doctrine. For that reason,
a variant of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half that forces the court to rewrite the agency's rule
on its own may be a less effective deterrent than a milder version.
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Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as Administrative
Common Law

At last we come to a question that arguably should have come
much earlier: Even if Chevron Step One-and-a-Half makes sense
as a prudential matter, can courts justify the doctrine as a jurisprudential matter? After all, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is a
judge-made doctrine, not derived from the text of the APA or any
other statute. Do courts have the authority to make up a doctrine
like this on their own?
The reality is that sometimes for these higher-order questions of administrative law, textual sources do not have much to
say. For instance, although both Chenery I and State Farm could,
in a pinch, be tied to the APA's bar on arbitrary and capricious
agency action, the nexus is not self-evident. At the same time,
however, what agencies are allowed to do has also expanded.
Chevron itself, for instance, is hardly compelled by any statutory
source, and, indeed, it may be in some tension with the APA.249 In
short, one cannot be asymmetric about these things: if deference
doctrines are allowed to stand (a question we leave for another
day), then doctrines that help police those deference doctrines
must also be allowed to expand. There no doubt is a bit of "administrative common law" in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, but that
alone is not necessarily a reason to reject the doctrine.250 If agencies are to be trusted with Chevron powers for reasons of political
accountability and expertise, then Chevron Step One-and-aHalf-which forces agencies to take accountability for their actions and pushes them to employ their expertise-protects the integrity of the Chevron framework.
Our tentative defense of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half still
leaves the doctrine open to attack on grounds that it violates the
principle that reviewing courts are "generally not free" to impose
procedural requirements on agencies unless those requirements
21
stem from the APA or some other statutory source. This principle-known as the Vermont Yankee rule for the case, Vermont

249 See, for example, Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1211
(2015) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) ("Heedless of the original design of the APA,
we have developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies' interpretations of statutes
and regulations.").
250 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80
Geo Wash L Rev 1293 (2012).
251 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
435 US 519, 524 (1978).
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Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v NaturalResources Defense Council,
in which it was announced-would seem to be in some tension with Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. After all, the requirement that an agency acknowledge ambiguity in the relevant statute as a prerequisite for deference at Chevron Step Two might be
described as an additional procedural requirement ginned up by
the DC Circuit and found nowhere in any statutory source.
We have no knockdown rebuttal to the Vermont Yankee objection, though we do have at least two responses. First, Chevron
Step One-and-a-Half is at least arguably justified on the basis of
Chenery I, which predates Vermont Yankee by several decades.253
And second, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is at least arguably a
logical extension of Chevron's holding that courts should defer in
instances when an agency enjoys a relative advantage in terms of
electoral accountability and expertise. If judges can decide that
agencies will receive deference under certain circumstances, then
presumably the same judges can decide in what circumstances
such deference ought not to be forthcoming. Our modest suggestion is that so long as they exist, deference-limiting doctrines
should be fitted to the values that motivated Chevron in the first
place. And by our lights, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half meets that
criterion.
Inc,252

CONCLUSION

Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is an important element of judicial review of agency statutory interpretations in the DC Circuitand there are at least signs of it taking hold in courts beyond the
District of Columbia's "ten Miles square."254 And yet so far the doctrine has largely escaped academic attention: casebooks and (with
few exceptions) commentators have passed over the gap between
Chevron Step One and Chevron Step Two. We seek to fill this void
by presenting the first comprehensive treatment of Chevron Step
252

435 US 519 (1978).

See Part II.B. Of course, some may grumble that this defense of Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half just kicks the can down the road. After all, why is Chenery I consistent with
the APA? See, for example, Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 293-95 (cited in note 12) (questioning whether a broad view of Chenery Icomports with the APA's instruction that courts
apply harmless-error principles). Yet Chenery I has a very strong claim to stare decisisit has been the law for more than seventy years. Equally important, it also predates the
APA, so presumably Congress legislated against the Chenery Ibackdrop. See, for example,
Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 698-99 (1979) ("[Olur evaluation of congressional action . .. must take into account its contemporary legal context.").
254 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 17.
253
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One-and-a-Half. We ask: Why does the doctrine exist, and are
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half s critics correct that the doctrine's
application "outstrips its rationale"?255
On our view, before one can answer those questions, it is essential to confront the puzzle at the heart of Chevron Step Oneand-a-Half: Why do these cases still arise? One might have expected that Prill would be a one-off, and that agencies would
quickly learn to insulate their rules from Step One-and-a-Half
attacks. And yet the last thirty years have proven that expectation to be incorrect. Perhaps the reason is that agencies are slow
to learn (in which case they would have to be very slow indeed!).
We believe, though, that any explanation sounding in agency ignorance is incomplete. Agency actors have strategic reasons to assert that statutes are unambiguous even when such assertions
increase the likelihood of a remand. Central to our argument is
the fact that reviewing courts are not the only relevant veto players in the administrative process: actors within and outside the
agency are, too. Moreover, agency actors are not trying to maximize only their probability of success in litigation; they also may
care about the allocation of credit and blame between themselves
and Congress, as well as the durability of their policies once their
successors grab the reins.
We are, of course, not the first to observe that agencies are
themselves multifaceted bodies, that agencies are concerned not
only about courts but also about OIRA, or that agencies seek to
entrench their preferred policies so that their work is not undone
by successors. We are, however, the first to explain how these considerations interact with Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. And these
strategic considerations not only help to explain why Chevron Step
One-and-a-Half cases continue to arise, but also may help to justify the doctrine's continued existence.

255 PDK LaboratoriesInc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F3d
786, 809 (DC Cir 2004) (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

